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ABSTRACT 
Despite its remarkable recent growth and dynamism, India still faces a number of 
challenges to its internal security and further development.  Of these, the threat posed by 
Naxalism, a Maoist insurrection active in the eastern half of the country for over four 
decades, is the most overlooked and analytically neglected in Western academic and 
security circles.  In the past seven years, Naxalite activity has grown in scope, breadth, 
and violence, in a “Red Corridor” stretching from Nepal to Tamil Nadu, and killed or 
displaced tens of thousands of people.  By 2006, the problem was so severe that India’s 
Prime Minister characterized the insurgency as the greatest internal security threat ever 
faced by his country.  Given India’s bloody history with separatist and communal 
violence, such a pronouncement is truly startling. 
This thesis undertakes an historical analysis of the Naxalite movement to assess 
how great a danger its current iteration truly poses, and what the implications might be 
for India’s continued rise.  Soberingly, it finds that the insurgency is indeed stronger and 
more dangerous today than at any time in the past.  Furthermore, while it does not pose 
an existential threat to the state in the same way as its counterpart in Nepal, it will prove 
extremely disruptive to India’s further growth and development if not swiftly and 
effectively countered.  New Delhi’s efforts in this regard are so far unimpressive, but it is 
not too late to act.  The United States has a vested interest in the emergence of a strong 
and stable India, and may be able to help its new “strategic partner” address the challenge 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PURPOSE 
“It would not be an exaggeration to say that the problem of Naxalism is the single 
biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.”1  With this startling 
pronouncement in April 2006, India’s Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, finally drew the 
West’s attention to an insurgency that had plagued his country for more than four 
decades, taking nearly 20,000 lives in the process.2  While the world was fixated on the 
violence in Kashmir, fundamentalist Islamic terrorism, and intermittent bouts of Hindu-
Muslim sectarian violence, an archaic Maoist ideology, rejected even in the land of its 
birth, was growing in scope, breadth, and violence.  Over the past seven years in 
particular, Naxalite rebels have come to control large swathes of the Indian countryside in 
a “Red Corridor” stretching from Nepal to Tamil Nadu and killed thousands of Indian 
security forces and civilians.  This thesis will examine the evolution of the Naxalite 
threat, from its humble beginnings in 1967 to the present, to ascertain the true danger 
posed to India’s rise as a twenty-first century Asian power. 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Since the end of the Cold War and economic reforms in the early 1990s, India’s 
performance has been truly staggering.  It would be difficult to overstate the key role the 
country is expected to assume in the global community over the coming decades.  With a 
population of over 1.2 billion, a young, growing, and increasingly educated workforce, 
and persistent real GDP growth rates in the area of 8 percent over the last decade, India is 
emerging as a powerful driver of the world economy.3  Its demographic clout and 
                                                 
1 Manmohan Singh, “Prime Minister’s Speech to the 2nd Meeting of the Standing Committee of Chief 
Ministers on Naxalism,” (speech, New Delhi, India, April 13, 2006), Government of India Press 
Information Bureau, http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page.asp?relid=17128 (accessed August 10, 2007). 
2 Jane’s Information Group, “India’s Mosaic of Conflict,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, 
July 14, 2004, http://www8.janes.com/ (accessed August 7, 2007). 
3  Ibid. 
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political ambitions are also thrusting it increasingly into positions of international 
leadership, as the debate on its accession to permanent membership on the UN Security 
Council attests.  If the twenty-first century is truly to be the “Asian Century,” India, along 
with China, will likely be leading the way.   
Since the late 1990s, India has also emerged as an increasingly important strategic 
partner to the United States.  In the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, India was one of 
the first countries in Asia to extend its support in the Global War on Terror, offering 
refueling rights to U.S. ships and aircraft on their way toward Afghanistan.  The strategic 
partnership has grown since then, most famously with the 10-year defense accord signed 
in 2005 and the U.S.-India civil nuclear cooperation agreement of 2006.4  The United 
States has been assiduously cultivating a closer relationship with New Delhi, and greater 
military and strategic ties between the two countries are clearly important components of 
future U.S. foreign policy in Asia. 
However, India’s effectiveness as a world leader and U.S. strategic partner is 
contingent upon its continued internal stability and economic development.  If Naxalism 
is as great a threat as many believe, its continuing spread will have serious negative 
repercussions on both fronts, to the detriment of India, the United States, and the larger 
world.  A comprehensive examination and analysis of the phenomenon, and its potential 
to derail India’s development, is therefore both timely and important. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Naxalist movement emerged in 1967 as an uprising of disaffected and 
disenfranchised peasants in Naxalbari, West Bengal.  Given its four decade long 
existence, there is generally a surprising dearth of academic study on the movement.  
Western scholarship on insurgency in South Asia usually focuses on the conflict in 
Kashmir and (perhaps surprisingly) the plethora of smaller insurrections in India’s 
                                                 
4  Jane’s Information Group, “Sentinel Security Assessment - South Asia:  India, External Affairs,” 
Jane’s Military and Security Assessments, April 26, 2007, http://www8.janes.com (accessed August 6, 
2007).  
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Northeast.5  What little attention is paid to Naxalism is focused almost solely on the 
underlying causes of insurgent movements in general, treating Naxalism simply as one 
case in a larger group.  Nevertheless, these treatments do provide valuable insight on 
contributing factors to the movement’s rise and persistence.  There seem to be two main 
schools of thought on this issue.  The first is that insurgencies arise out of unmet political 
demands, usually from a minority that feels it is being oppressed.6  The second school of 
thought cites economic inequality as a reason for insurgent uprising, typified by the 
revolts of lower class social groups against what they feel is lack of access to economic 
gain.7  A third, smaller body of literature stresses the importance of contributing factors, 
asserting that uprisings are more likely to occur where the terrain provides sanctuary to 
small groups that can train, equip, and educate their followers outside the reach of 
government forces.8  In the case of Naxalism, elements of all three theories seem to be at 
play, and are echoed in the literature from outside the West. 
Unsurprisingly, the study of the Naxalite movement is more extensive in India 
itself.  Here, however, the problem seems to be not so much a lack of analysis, but the 
questionable objectivity, quality, and relevance of much of the scholarship.  A few works 
on the early phases of Naxalite activity are extant, but many of these are biased to 
varying degrees, written by the movement’s sympathizers or even the Maoist 
revolutionaries themselves.9  Of somewhat greater objectivity are a handful of histories 
authored by journalists, but their scope, too, is limited to the earliest years of Naxalite 
                                                 
5  Lawrence E. Cline, “The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India,” Small Wars and Insurgencies 
17, no. 2 (June 2006): 126-147; Sumit Ganguly, “Explaining the Kashmir Insurgency,” International 
Security 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 76-107. 
6  James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War,” American Political 
Science Review 97, no. 1 (February 2003): 75-90;  Ashutosh Varshney, "Why Democracy Survives," 
Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 (1998): 36- 50. 
7  Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, “Inequality and Insurgency,” American Political 
Science Review 81, no. 2 (June 1987): 425-452; Jenkins, Rob,  "Democracy, Development and India's 
Struggle Against Corruption," Public Policy Research 13, no. 3 (September 2006): 147-165.  
8  D. M. (John) Mitra, “Understanding Indian Insurgencies: Implications for Counterinsurgency 
Operations in the Third World,” (MS thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2005). 
9 For examples, see:  
Biplab Dasgupta, The Naxalite Movement (Bombay: Allied Publishers, 1974);  
Rabindra Ray, The Naxalites and their Ideology (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988); and 
Sumanta Banerjee, India’s Simmering Revolution:  The Naxalite Uprising (London: Zed Books, 1984). 
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activity.10  Moreover, the analytical rigor of many of these treatments leaves something 
to be desired.  With respect to more recent analysis, there appears to be relatively little 
peer- reviewed research on the subject.  In its place is a fairly large volume of study, of 
varying quality, from numerous interested parties and private organizations.  While this 
situation presents a unique opportunity for original research, it also poses the challenge of 
separating objective, factual analysis from more biased or skewed reporting.   
Within this latter body of more recent literature, the vast majority of debate 
focuses on the causes of the current phase of Naxalite insurgency and speculation as to 
the most effective ways to deal with it.  Broadly speaking, two groups with competing 
viewpoints emerge from all this contention.  The first, or “law and order” camp, 
considers the Naxalite problem primarily a security issue.  The main proponents of this 
point of view are security analysts and researchers like K.P.S. Gill and Ajai Sahni, many 
of them associated with India-based think tanks like the Institute for Conflict 
Management.11  While acknowledging socio-economic marginalization as a contributing 
factor, they view the lack of effective state and municipal policing, poor coordination of 
security efforts with New Delhi, and lenient policies toward Naxalite groups as the root 
causes of the insurgency. Citing numerous failed efforts at peace talks with what they 
view as an intransigent, nihilistic enemy, this group advocates strongly for the active 
suppression of Naxalism by force, with increased utilization of central government forces 
if necessary.12  
                                                 
10 For examples, see:  
Sankar Ghosh, The Naxalite Movement: A Maoist Experiment (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 
1974);  
Sohail Jawaid, The Naxalite Movement in India: Origin and Failure of the Maoist Revolutionary Strategy 
in West Bengal 1967-1971 (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1979). 
11 The Institute for Conflict Management, “An Introduction,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/icm/index.html (accessed July 19, 2007). 
12  Much of the literature generated by these analysts is published on the ‘South Asia Terrorism 
Portal.’ Organized by K.P.S. Gill, the controversial ‘supercop’ who crushed the Sikh insurgency in Punjab 
in the early 1990s, the SATP is a comprehensive resource for writings and analysis on terrorism and related 
security issues in South Asia. In particular, see:      
K.P.S. Gill, “Imperatives of Justice,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, April 30, 2005, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/kpsgill/governance/07june25pio.htm (accessed July 20, 2007);      
K.P.S. Gill, “Blood Sweat and Anger,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, July 13, 2006, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/kpsgill/governance/06dailynewsjuly13.htm (accessed July 20, 2007);     
Ajai Sahni, “The Angry Men of Mao,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, February 4, 2006, 
http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/dailynews&analysis13022007.htm (accessed July 20, 2007). 
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In contrast, the “development” camp views Naxalism as fundamentally the result 
of poverty and political disenfranchisement.  Represented by NGOs such as Human 
Rights Watch and the Asian Center for Human Rights, and think tanks such as the 
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, this camp takes a far more holistic attitude toward 
the most desirable means of combating Naxal violence.13  Stressing the need for poverty 
reduction, land reform, and better local governance, adherents to this line of reasoning 
reject government sponsored violence as a solution to the Naxalite problem except in the 
most extreme circumstances.14  As P. V. Ramana puts it, “If the military option were 
effective, then the problem should not have resurfaced after the initial Naxalbari uprising 
was suppressed.”15  Indeed, this group views overly aggressive action on the part of 
security forces as one of the contributing causes of further radicalization in the 
countryside.  
At first blush, the position of Ramana and his cohorts strikes one as an 
oversimplification of an extremely nuanced security situation.  How, for example, is 
development aid supposed to be distributed if the people in the process of doing so are 
consistently under the threat of Naxalite attack?  The same can be said, however, of the 
“law and order” argument, and its rather singular emphasis on the use of force to quell an 
insurgency that doubtless draws much support from the disaffection of the rural poor.  
Analysis of many prior guerrilla conflicts has certainly drawn attention to the need for 
addressing the underlying causes of rural discontent in order to draw support away from  
 
                                                 
13  For examples, see:       
Asian Centre for Human Rights, “Naxal Conflict in 2006,” Asian Centre for Human Rights Report, 
http://pdfdownload.bofd.net/pdf2html.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.achrweb.org%2Freports%2Findia%
2FAR07%2F..%2F..%2F..%2Freports%2Findia%2Fnaxal0107.pdf (accessed August 6, 2007);      
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, “Left Extremism in India: Naxal Movement in Chattisgarh & 
Orissa,” Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Special Report 25, June 2006; 
http://pdftohtml.ganjalinux.org/pdf2html.php?url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.ipcs.org%2FIPCS-Special-
Report-25.pdf (accessed August 6, 2007). 
14  Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, “Naxalism and Internal Security in India,” Institute of 
Peace and Conflict Studies Seminar, August 4, 2007, 
http://www.ipcs.org/newIpcsSeminars2.jsp?action=showView&kValue=2362 (accessed August 6, 2007). 
15  Ibid. 
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the insurgent base.16  Additionally, neither group adequately examines the efficacy of 
previous governmental policies and responses, a rather glaring oversight if one hopes to 
prescribe a current course of action.   
Compounding the debate is disagreement on the nature of the threat currently 
posed by the insurgency.  The “law and order” crowd focuses almost exclusively on the 
movement’s implications for political stability in India, but their analysis tends to be a bit 
shrill.17  While there has certainly been a greater level of political instability in the 
regions affected by Naxalism, it has tended to remain in the country’s remote rural areas.  
Their assertions that the ‘Red Menace’ threatens to split India in two and seriously 
undermine central authority seems hyperbolic, especially given the fact that the 
movement draws on, at the most, 10,000 - 20,000 hard-core cadres.18 
The “development camp,” by contrast, tends to view the Naxalist threat primarily 
in terms of its humanitarian dimension.  These analysts focus on the recent internal 
displacement of tens of thousands of rural and tribal peoples, and the atrocities committed 
by both Maoist rebels and the government security forces, as the insurgency’s greatest 
dangers.19  While this argument is emotionally compelling, it is by no means clear that 
this aspect of the threat represents a serious strategic problem for New Delhi in and of 
itself.  India’s population is enormous, and the small percentage directly affected account 
for only marginal contributions to overall GDP.20 
What seem to be greater threats are the larger economic implications of the 
Naxalite insurgency in the context of India’s growth and development, and its potential 
for further spread as the social impacts of globalization are felt throughout the country.  
                                                 
16  For an excellent example of this argument, see Jeffrey Race, War Comes to Long An: 
Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1972).  
17  Ajai Sahni, “Left Wing Extremism in India: Evolving Strategies for Containment,” South Asia 
Terrorism Portal, October 2006,  http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/crpfdelhi.htm (accessed August 6, 
2007). 
18  Reuters, “Indian Maoist Violence,” Reuters AlertNet, June 27, 2007, 
http://www.alertnet.org/printable.htm?URL=/db/crisisprofiles/IN_MAO.htm (accessed August 6, 2007). 
19  See the aforementioned Asian Center for Human Rights Report, “Naxal Conflict in 2006” and 
Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies Seminar, “Naxalism and Internal Security in India.” 
20  Ibid. 
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As The Economist recently noted, the five states most affected by insurgent violence 
account for significant mineral deposits and a majority of the nation’s energy resources.21  
Also, while Naxalist expansion into the Western and Southern Deccan has received some 
scrutiny, no serious attention is being given to its possible spread into India’s wild 
Northeastern states.  On initial inspection, the political stability, development level, and 
demography of this region appear eerily similar to those areas already afflicted by 
Naxalite violence.22  The fact that the Northeast also contains significant fossil fuel 
deposits only adds to the threat of the Maoists gaining a foothold.23  Clearly, any 
worthwhile examination of the dangers posed by Naxalism must take into account the 
changing nature of the social and economic contexts within which it operates. 
The analytical oversights and divergences of opinion discussed above are also 
reflected within the administration in New Delhi, where contradictory statements, 
confusion, and inconsistent policymaking characterize governmental responses to the 
most recent Maoist threat.24  As might be expected, these efforts have proven less than 
effective in countering the Naxalite problem, or even checking its growth in recent years.  
This manifest intellectual incoherence on the part of leaders, analysts, and policymakers 
has many causes, but is mainly due to a lack of perspective on the nature of the challenge 
confronting them.   
In an examination of the literature on this subject, from all the various points of 
view, the most striking feature is the absence of any comprehensive historical analysis of 
the Naxalite movement, the evolution of its organization, aims, and leadership, or how 
India’s own political, economic, and social development has contributed to (or 
ameliorated) the virulence of the movement.  Given the relatively long lifespan of this 
                                                 
21  Economist, “India’s Politics,” Economist Intelligence Unit ViewsWire, March 19, 2007, 
http://www.economist.com/agenda/displaystory.cfm?story_id=8875555 (accessed August 7, 2007). 
22  Cline, 126-149. 
23  Jane’s Information Group, “Sentinel Security Assessment - South Asia:  India, Natural Resources,” 
Jane’s Military and Security Assessments, April 27, 2005, http://www8.janes.com (accessed August 6, 
2007).  
24  P.V. Ramana, “Dealing With Naxalism: Shotgun Approach,” Observer Research Foundation, 
January 17, 2007, 
http://www.observerindia.com/cms/sites/orfonline/modules/analysis/AnalysisDetail.html?cmaid=5560&m
macmaid=5561 (accessed August 6, 2007).  
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insurgency, it seems unlikely that a full understanding of Naxalism, or a true appreciation 
of its threats, can be gleaned solely by analyzing its most current iteration.  With the 
recent spread of Naxalite activity and the notable concern it has elicited from high levels 
of the Indian government, this lack of an objective, realistic, and comprehensive 
examination represents a significant gap in the existing literature on the subject.  This 
thesis will aim to fill that gap. 
D. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES 
This thesis will use the comparative case study method to analyze the evolution of 
the Naxalite movement and assess the danger posed by the most recent upsurge in 
Naxalite activity. To draw an important distinction, it will not directly address the 
veracity of Prime Minister Singh’s assertion that “Naxalism is the single greatest internal 
security challenge ever faced” by his country.  Given the plethora of insurgencies and 
violent communal movements still active in India, such an assessment would provide 
enough material for several lengthy theses.  Instead, the central question posed here is 
whether the Naxalite movement currently represents a qualitatively different, and more 
dangerous, challenge to Indian political stability and development than it has in the past.  
As mentioned previously, the Naxalite insurgency is not a new phenomenon in India, and 
has been a thorn in the side of the country for over four decades.  Generally speaking, its 
history can be broken down into three distinct periods, most easily distinguished by their 
level of insurgent activity and violence.   
The first period runs from the movement’s beginning in 1967 to its temporary 
suppression in 1972.  This era encompassed the initial organization of the Naxalite 
movement and the rather rapid spread from its birthplace in West Bengal to a number of 
other states, notably Bihar and Andhra Pradesh.  The second period, from 1972 until 
about 1991, was notable for the ideological and physical fragmentation of the movement, 
and its mostly localized activity in pockets of rural India.  The third period  (perhaps not 
coincidentally contemporaneous with India’s economic reforms) runs from 1991 to the 
present, and is distinguished by a process of gradual consolidation, culminating in the 
merger of the two most powerful insurgent groups (Maoist Communist Center and the 
 9
People’s War Group) in late 2004.25  The years since 2000 have witnessed the most 
dramatic escalation in the scope, breadth, and intensity of Naxalite violence. 
These three periods of activity will comprise the individual cases under 
investigation.  To assess the nature and danger of the insurgency in each era, we will 
examine how variations in three independent variables (the socio-economic and political 
milieux, internal characteristics of the Naxalite movement, and governmental response) 
affected the dependent variable, the overall level of threat posed by the movement.  These 
three cases will then be compared to determine whether or not the Naxalite movement 
indeed represents a greater danger to India than it has in the past, what specifically that 
danger is, and how it is likely to develop in the future.  Finally, I will explore the 
implications for India’s continued rise and its prospects as a strategic partner of the 
United States. 
Primary and secondary source materials are utilized to the maximum extent 
practical.  Primary sources consist largely of internal documents from the Government of 
India and Naxalite organizations, as well as quotes and speeches from government and 
insurgent leaders.  As mentioned in the literature review, there is not as much rigorous 
academic source material on this issue as one might like.  What peer-reviewed work there 
is receives primacy of place, but publications and studies from interested NGOs, think 
tanks, and security analysts also contain valuable information, and are included in this 
study.  Finally, significant tertiary source material, in the form of coverage from 
reputable news media like The Economist, Frontline (an Indian weekly), and the Times of 
India, is required to fill factual gaps in the existing literature. 
E. TERMINOLOGY ISSUES 
For the purposes of this thesis, the generic term Maoist will refer to the Indian 
variety and be used interchangeably with Naxalite.  Obviously, Maoist movements and 
organizations exist in many forms throughout the world and there are a number of others 
active in South Asia, most famously in Nepal.  Other than a shared political ideology and 
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sympathy with each other’s causes, these groups remain separate and distinct entities, and 
care should be taken not confuse or conflate Naxalism with other Maoist movements 
more generally.  When referring to Maoist organizations other than the Naxalites, the full 
name and country of origin are provided to avoid ambiguity. 
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II. THE ORGANIZATIONAL PERIOD (1967–1972)  
A. INTRODUCTION 
To inform an assessment of the relative threat posed by the current Naxalite 
insurgency, this chapter will undertake an historical analysis of the movement’s 
organization and initial activity in the period from 1967 to 1972.  This era encompasses 
the birth of Naxalism and its fairly rapid rise as a force on the Indian political scene, and 
therefore presents a potentially illuminating parallel to the resurgence of violent Maoism 
in recent years.  It also witnessed the movement’s initial failure, and so may contain 
useful lessons for countering the modern threat.  To begin, a brief look at the history of 
Indian communism is in order. 
For the world’s largest democracy, India has a surprisingly long and complicated 
relationship with Marxist ideology.  First emerging in 1920, in the fires of the Indian 
independence movement, it has grown into a major force on the sub-continent’s political 
scene.  While all of its proponents adhere to the ultimate goal of building a utopian 
classless society, they have not always agreed on the most desirable method of achieving 
it.  Nevertheless, whether motivating an underground subversive element or an 
aboveground, election-contesting political party, the basic ideology has proven 
remarkably resilient in the Indian context.  Any examination of the birth of the Naxalite 
movement in the latter half of the 1960s requires an understanding of its development 
within this larger phenomenon. 
Jawaid Sohail, an Indian academic studying the origins of the Naxalites, divides 
the evolution of the Indian communist movement into six broad periods.26  From its birth 
until 1941, the Communist Party of India (CPI) suffered from poor organization and 
leadership.  Outlawed by the British colonial authorities, it languished in relative 
obscurity.  However, when Great Britain formed an alliance with the Soviet Union 
following the outbreak of World War II, the communists enjoyed a new legitimacy, 
                                                 
26 Jawaid, 4. 
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which they exploited by allying themselves with the popular Indian National Congress 
from 1941-1945.  After World War II, this alliance foundered on the emerging 
international split between East and West, and the CPI moved into opposition against the 
growing power of Congress in New Delhi.   
Around the time of India’s independence in 1947, a struggle erupted between the 
peasants and their ruler in the princely state of Hyderabad, which was vacillating on 
accession to the Indian union.  Inspired by the contemporaneous example of Mao’s 
“People’s Revolution” in China (and encouraged by its ideological benefactor, the Soviet 
Union), the CPI embarked on the fourth phase of its activity, supporting an armed 
agrarian uprising against feudal oppression in Hyderabad that became known as the 
Telangana movement.  In 1948, when the Indian armed forces moved in to forcibly annex 
the Hyderabad principality, the Telangana insurgents turned against New Delhi.  While 
this initial struggle achieved some degree of early success, temporarily “liberating” more 
than 3,000 villages and 16,000 square miles of territory, a confluence of events resulted 
in its ultimate demise. The strength of the Indian armed forces eventually proved 
overpowering, and a large number of the rebels were killed.  Additionally, in an attempt 
to curry favor with India, the Soviet Union (which had encouraged the uprising in its 
earlier days) summarily withdrew its support.   Taking the hint, the CPI dutifully 
followed suit in 1951.27   
The failure of Telangana inaugurated the fifth period of communist activity, when 
the CPI, again at Soviet urging, sought to contest national and state elections in a bid to 
bring about the peaceful imposition of communist rule through democratic conduct.  For 
many of the CPI’s more radical cadres, however, this decision was viewed as a betrayal 
of the Party’s revolutionary heritage.  The memories of Telangana loomed large in their 
ideological imaginings and a sizeable faction of the CPI began to drift toward a more 
Maoist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism as the 1950s progressed.28   
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This rise of factionalism within the CPI defines the last of Sohail’s six phases and 
would reach its zenith in the 1960s.  With the growing Sino-Soviet split from 1958-1964, 
the ideological tensions within the CPI continued to mount.  These were only exacerbated 
by the emerging Sino-Indian border dispute in the early 1960s, in which the CPI 
leadership came down firmly on the side of New Delhi.  The pro-Chinese leftists within 
the party branded this policy as revisionism of the worst sort, and attempted to wrest 
control from the pro-Soviet faction.  Unable to muster sufficient support, they instead 
broke away from the CPI in 1964 to form the Communist Party of India-Marxist, or CPI-
(M).29 
However, the CPI-(M) was almost immediately beset by the same kind of 
ideological infighting that had precipitated its formation. The relatively more restrained 
group that formed the party’s leadership, though still hostile to the Soviet Union, 
grudgingly embraced electoral politics as a means of bringing about a more or less 
peaceful revolution in India.  Consequently, when the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War broke out, 
it quickly condemned Pakistan and its Chinese patron in an effort to capitalize on the 
wave of nationalist sentiment sweeping India.  This tactic proved remarkably successful, 
and CPI-(M) candidates enjoyed surprising success in the 1967 elections in West Bengal, 
firmly entrenching the new party within the Indian political process. This proved to be 
too much for the more radical Maoist faction, and it was within this contentious milieu 
that the Naxalite movement was born.30 
There were now three major communist strands within India:  the CPI, the CPI-
(M), and the violently radical Maoists.  This last group, eventually named for the 
birthplace of their armed struggle in Naxalbari, West Bengal, would in due course form a 
third, underground organization, the Communist Party of India-Marxist Leninist, or CPI-
(ML).  Unlike its progenitors, the CPI-(ML) was totally opposed to the electoral process 
and espoused violent revolution as the only legitimate means of realizing its political 
agenda.  In short, this entailed nothing less than the complete overthrow of the existing 
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political structure, corrupted as it was by the four evils of “U.S. imperialism, Soviet 
social-imperialism, feudalism, and comprador-bureaucrat capital.”31  From 1967-1972, 
this group embarked on a campaign of political terror that caused no small amount of 
consternation to national and state governments, and resonated, at least initially, with 
many poor residents of West Bengal, Bihar, and Andhra Pradesh.  To understand why, 
one must appreciate India’s broader political, economic, and social contexts during this 
period. 
B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
1. Political Developments 
The first seventeen years of India’s independence were marked by the political 
hegemony of the Congress Party, personified in the undisputed leadership of Jawaharlal 
Nehru.32  Under his charismatic influence, the fissiparous tendencies of India’s many 
ethnic, linguistic, religious, and social groups were kept in check, and the country 
emerged as a surprising beacon of political stability in South Asia.  His passing in 1964, 
however, (and the subsequent death of his successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri, after only two 
years in power) left the Congress Party rudderless, and the leadership that had united 
India’s various groups under the mantle of nationalism was gone.  Over the next few 
years, the INC embarked on a process of infighting that diminished its iron grip on 
political power and allowed alternative forces of social mobilization to pose new 
challenges to its authority.33 
From 1966-1972, this drama played out at the national level in the struggle 
between Indira Gandhi and Morarji Desai for the position of Prime Minister and head of 
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Congress.  While Mrs. Gandhi emerged at the head of a coalition of Congress factions, 
the structure proved too unwieldy to contest the 1967 national elections as effectively as 
it had in the past.  Beset by a number of economic and social crises (discussed below), 
Congress suffered its worst electoral performance in history, winning only 40% of the 
popular vote and barely hanging on to majority in a parliament it had previously 
dominated.34  With its attention again focused inwardly, factional battles quickly 
resumed.  Following another disappointing performance in the mid-term elections of 
1969, the party officially split into two competing camps:  Congress (O) under Morarji 
Desai, and Congress (R) under Indira {later Congress (I)}.35  Though she still 
commanded a plurality in parliament, Mrs. Gandhi now had to rely on a coalition of 
leftist parties to give her a working majority, a fact that complicated her ability to respond 
forcefully to the growing Naxalite movement. 
The decline in Congress hegemony at the center was mirrored by its performance 
in the state elections of 1967.  From a position of complete dominance in nearly all the 
state legislatures, the party won only 1,661 of a total 3,453 contested seats.36  Moreover, 
for the first time, non-Congress led coalition governments came to power in a number of 
states.  These included West Bengal and Orissa, both of which would shortly be affected 
by the growing Naxalite movement.  Notably, the United Democratic Front (UDF) 
government that formed in West Bengal contained a large and influential bloc of CPI-(M) 
legislators, a fact that proved important on a number of counts.  As previously mentioned, 
the party’s successful embrace of electoral politics served to further radicalize the already 
restive militant faction within the CPI-(M).  Additionally, while the moderate members of 
the CPI-(M) and the Naxalites did become bitter enemies, as we shall see, the legacy of 
their earlier cooperation and shared ideology would greatly complicate the state 
government’s efforts to effectively counter their activities.  
The structural shifts underway on India’s political scene thus served to facilitate 
the emergence and spread of Naxalism in a number of ways.  The temporary decline of 
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legitimacy at the center created greater instability that allowed alternative ideologies to 
take root, while the rise to power of a number of leftist parties (including the 
Communists) provided breathing room for their more extreme ideological brethren.  
Concurrently, the new requirements of coalition building diverted politicians’ attention 
from the essential task of ensuring security in their constituencies.37  To these must be 
added one more consideration:  the fractious nature of political activity undoubtedly 
complicated the policymaking process at a time when the country faced a range of serious 
economic problems.  While these did not necessarily arise as a result of the political 
turmoil, the ability of the system to effectively address them was certainly curtailed. 
2. Economic Developments 
In spite of a series of Soviet-inspired Five Year Plans from 1951-1966, India 
remained a predominantly rural, agrarian economy.  Burdened by generally inefficient 
and backward agricultural methods, it was extremely prone to underproduction and food 
shortages, a situation exacerbated by the country’s rapidly expanding population.  The 
lack of proper irrigation and over-dependence on the seasonal monsoon rains caused 
widespread famine in 1952-53, and severe (if localized) food shortages in Bihar and West 
Bengal from 1965 to 1967.38  Perennially reliant on foreign food aid, particularly from 
the United States, Indira’s government was forced to seek even greater assistance from 
America in 1966, which she received in the form of increased wheat shipments and over 
$400 million U.S. for the implementation of India’s fourth Five-Year Plan.39 
The focus of this plan was, in the words of Mrs. Gandhi, to “lay the foundation 
for a breakthrough in agriculture in the countryside,” primarily through state 
subsidization for a host of agrarian technology reforms that came to be known as the 
Green Revolution.  Indeed, the combination of expanded irrigation networks, increased 
use of fertilizer and pesticides, and the utilization of higher-yielding crop varietals that 
had become available in 1965 did improve the food situation; by the early 1970s, India 
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was self-sufficient in grain production for the first time in its history.40  Like most 
revolutions, however, this one took time to develop and produced a large amount of 
economic dislocation.  Nowhere was this more evident than in West Bengal. 
These new technologies, while partly government sponsored, still required a fairly 
significant initial capital outlay to procure and utilize to their fullest advantage.  
Moreover, they tended to be best employed on relatively large tracts of land so cultivators 
could reap economies of scale in the new methods of production.  As Edward Duyker 
points out in his study of the predominantly agrarian Santal tribe in West Bengal, this had 
the effect of economically favoring large landholders over smaller farmers, widening 
what were already significant income disparities between the two.41  In a system that had 
its roots in the Zamindars of the British colonial era, most of these smaller farmers were 
in fact sharecroppers, forced to give up as much as 50% of their harvest in rent to their 
jotedars, or landlords. To make matters worse, if smaller farmers were to avail 
themselves of the new technology at all, they often had to take out loans from village 
moneylenders at exorbitant rates of interest, usually only worsening their economic 
situation.42 
What these long-suffering peasants were most in need of was a comprehensive 
system of land reform and rural development.  Given the strongly socialist leanings of 
both Nehru and his daughter, the failure of the government to effectively tackle these 
problems previously was an indication of the power of entrenched vested interests.  To be 
sure, a number of initiatives had been implemented, notably the Community 
Development and Rural Extension Program under the auspices of the Ford Foundation, 
the Panchayati Raj program, and a series of land reform laws in the 1950s and 60s.43  
Unfortunately, a combination of corruption, cronyism, and loopholes in the legislation 
prevented any of these measures from having much of an impact on the landless laborers, 
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tribals, and small farmers they were designed to help.44  On the contrary, larger 
landowners and jotedars were often able to twist the new regulations in their favor, 
worsening the plight of many of the rural poor, particularly in West Bengal.  
Nor were economic hardships confined to the countryside.  Like most of India, 
Calcutta had been suffering from economic stagnation for a number of years, and when 
the Indian government was forced to devalue the rupee in 1966, it had financial 
repercussions that hit the city hard.  The resulting inflation spawned an industrial 
recession in 1966-67, causing unemployment to increase to dangerous proportions, 
particularly among the educated youth.  While precise figures for this period are 
unavailable, anecdotal evidence suggests that from one third to one half of all the 
unemployed were aged 16-24.45  With so much economic frustration in the cities and the 
countryside, it is not surprising that incidents of social unrest increased as well. 
3. Social Developments  
Given the feudal socio-economic nature of much of its history, peasant uprisings 
in India were not uncommon.  From 1783 to 1900 alone, at the height of the British Raj, 
over 100 such incidents affected the region to greater or lesser degrees, many of them in 
the perennially restive province of Bengal.46  As the Telangana uprising in the late 1940s 
showed, post-independence Indian society was no less susceptible to their occurrence.  In 
retrospect, it appears obvious that many of the factors that had precipitated these events 
in the past were present in the latter half of the 1960s.  As the living situation deteriorated 
for a substantial number of India’s peasants, strikes and food riots became increasingly 
frequent in the later 1960s.47  By 1967, many Bengali newspapers carried accounts of 
impoverished rural citizens driven to suicide by their dire economic straits.48  While the 
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authenticity of all these accounts is difficult to establish, they were emblematic of the 
desperation and discontent of a large segment of the Indian countryside. 
The situation in urban society was showing signs of similar strain.  Disease, 
overcrowding, and a lack of adequate infrastructure had long been endemic to most of 
India’s major cities.  Now, as a result of the chronic unemployment discussed in the 
previous section, increasing numbers of young people were also turning to petty 
criminality and other anti-social behavior.  Known as the “lumpen-proletariat” in Marxist 
circles, the activities of these idle and angry youth served to further destabilize an already 
fragile social situation.49  Compounding this tendency was the wave of student radicalism 
sweeping the world in the latter 1960s.  Anti-establishment rhetoric and leftist activism 
were common on university campuses throughout India, but especially prevalent in 
Calcutta.  In 1965, the Communist faction captured the leadership of the student’s union 
at the prestigious Presidency College and embarked on a campaign of disobedience, 
strikes, and protests, many of them violent.50  As clashes between police and urban 
youths worsened over the ensuing years, Calcutta’s student population grew more 
radicalized. 
Watching these developments from their safe houses, the leaders of the Maoist 
faction in the CPI-(M) grew more confident by the day.  The contradictions inherent in 
India’s “semi-feudal and semi-colonial” society, it seemed to them, were reaching their 
breaking point, and the situation was ripe for the masses to rise up and finally deliver 
India from its centuries of capitalist domination.  To ignite this potent mixture of urban 
and rural unrest, all that was needed was a spark.   
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C. INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY 
1. Organization and Leadership 
Two men in particular laid the groundwork for Naxalism’s emergence in 1967.  
Kanu Sanyal, a long-time CPI-(M) organizer active among the Santal tribals in 
Darjeeling, was among those within the party who disagreed strongly with its newly 
conciliatory leanings toward New Delhi and electoral politics.  He discovered an 
ideological mentor in a passionate but lesser known party functionary, Charu 
Mazumdar.51  Mazumdar, born to a high caste family in Darjeeling district in 1918, had 
joined the Communist movement as a young man while attending university, and 
remained active in the CPI and CPI-(M) for most of his adult life.  By the mid-1960s, he 
had wholeheartedly embraced Maoism as the only valid form of Communist struggle for 
the Indian situation.  Adhering to Mao’s dictum that “political power grows from the 
barrel of a gun,” Mazumdar utterly rejected electoral politics and sought to apply the 
lessons of the Chinese revolution, as he saw them, to the struggle in his own country.52  
In this, he was greatly influenced by the writings of Lin Biao, the Vice-Chairman of the 
Communist Party of China (CPC), and his strategic formulations for guerrilla warfare.53  
Mazumdar laid out his theories in a series of essays penned between 1965 and 1967 that 
served as something of a manifesto for his more radical comrades, particularly in West 
Bengal.54  In those two years, elements of the CPI-(M) started veering on a more overtly 
militant course.     
Under the guidance of Sanyal and Mazumdar, on March 3, 1967, an uprising of 
poor tribals and peasants erupted in the village of Naxalbari, in the Siliguri sub-division 
of Darjeeling.  While initially confined to the seizure of land and food-grains hoarded by 
the jotedars, it soon turned violent and began spreading to other villages in Siliguri.  By 
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July 5, the movement had grown large enough to attract the attention of its ideological 
progenitor, the Communist Party of China (CPC), which, in an editorial in Beijing’s 
People’s Daily, lauded it as “a peal of spring thunder [that] has crashed over the land of 
India,” and “a development of tremendous significance for the Indian people’s 
revolutionary struggle.”55  In reality, the rebellion was not quite that momentous at this 
stage, as the ease with which it was put down by the West Bengal government would 
attest.  In late July, increased police action and a near total lack of coordination within the 
movement began to take their toll, and the initial uprising disintegrated by September.56  
Nevertheless, the fire had been lit.  Mazumdar emerged as a revolutionary leader and his 
ideology attracted an increasing number of adherents.  Now known as Naxalites, militant 
groups inspired by Mazumdar’s theories began appearing throughout India.  Emboldened 
by China’s rhetorical support, Mazumdar and these like-minded radicals officially broke 
from the CPI-(M). 
In November 1967, the All India Coordination Committee of Revolutionaries 
(AICCR, later renamed the All India Coordination Committee of Communist 
Revolutionaries, AICCCR) was formed in an attempt to gather the various strands of 
Naxalism under the banner of one revolutionary party.57  Though largely successful, the 
deliberations in this body revealed a number of ideological differences among the groups 
that would prove extremely divisive in a few years.  In two cases, that of the Andhra 
faction of the AICCCR led by Nagi Reddy and another group known as Dakshin Desh, 
the differences proved insurmountable at an early stage, resulting in their exclusion from 
the nascent organization.  Nevertheless, in April 1969, the formation of the CPI-(ML), 
with Mazumdar at the head, was announced in Calcutta and quickly endorsed by the 
CPC.58  It had an estimated 17,000 members at its founding, the majority in Andhra 
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Pradesh and West Bengal.59  For the next three years, the CPI-(ML) would be the 
dominant face of Naxalism in India.  With the pronouncement that the “Chinese 
Chairman is our Chairman, the Chinese path is our path,” Mazumdar’s agenda for the 
Naxalites was codified at the First Party Congress in May 1970.  It explicitly called for a 
Maoist inspired violent overthrow of the Indian government by establishing liberated 
bases in the countryside, surrounding the cities, and eventually subsuming all of India 
within its “people’s democratic revolution.”60  While Mazumdar’s heady optimism may 
be understandable in the international political context of the late 1960s, the techniques 
he advocated for accomplishing these objectives were questionable, to say the least. 
2. Strategy and Tactics 
Mazumdar’s strategy was predicated on the assumption that the contradiction 
between feudalism and the masses of India’s rural poor had reached the breaking point.61  
In his estimation, the situation was ripe for a spontaneous uprising of the beleaguered 
peasants that would sweep the old political order from the scene in a few short years.  In 
a 1968 article in Liberation, the Naxalites’ primary propaganda mouthpiece, Mazumdar 
opined that the People’s Liberation Army would be marching through the countryside 
“by the beginning of 1971, if not in 1970.”62   This outlook informed his strategic 
formulations in a number of ways. 
The first was an emphasis on the rural peasants as the true base of the 
revolution.63  The focus of revolutionary activity was squarely on the countryside, with 
urban agitation initially prohibited.  However, with the majority of the rural population 
illiterate, Mazumdar was forced to rely on educated ideologues to form the ground level 
leadership of his organization.  To this end, he encouraged the recruitment and 
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participation of educated urban youth, but demanded they leave the cities and adopt the 
ways of the local villagers to better indoctrinate and lead them in their revolutionary 
struggle.64  While a large number of radicalized college students (especially from 
Calcutta) heeded this call, their insinuation into rural society was highly problematic.  
Most were quite incapable of adapting to village life, and their different customs 
engendered suspicion from the more parochial tribals and farmers.65  As a result, while 
peasants were often capable of being motivated for local actions, they generally failed to 
adopt Naxalism’s broader ideology.66  As Dipak Gupta notes, the vast majority of activist 
cadres were educated and from upper caste Hindu families, with poor, illiterate peasants 
accounting for less than 20% of the committed membership.67 
One reason for this apathy among the peasants may have been the Naxalites’ 
renunciation of mass movements, the second pillar of Mazumdar’s strategy.  In his 
estimation, since the country was on the verge of a spontaneous revolution, it needed no 
organizing force to guide it.  Indeed, mass organizations could only hurt the movement, 
as they would give the enemy a focus for retaliation.68  While the formation of the CPI-
(ML) may seem to contradict this outlook, in reality, the party functioned more 
symbolically than as a classical political or military organization.  While Mazumdar’s 
ideology did reign supreme, operational control was actually quite decentralized, with 
village and district level organizations enjoying almost complete autonomy.  This 
situation utterly precluded the development of any sort of broader economic or social 
agenda that might have been useful in attracting greater peasant support.  In fact, 
Mazumdar believed that attention devoted to social or economic programs could only 
detract from the primary goal of seizing political power from the state, and actively 
discouraged their formulation.69 
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Rather than offering hope, Mazumdar contended that the way to inspire India’s 
poor was to offer the opportunity for revenge.  This accounted for the third pillar of his 
overall strategy, which he dubbed the “annihilation of class enemies.”70  As the name 
suggests, this entailed the deliberately brutal murder of jotedars, moneylenders, and 
agents of the government in an effort to spread “red terror” throughout the countryside.71  
With the injunction that “he who has not dipped his hand in the blood of class enemies 
can hardly be called a communist,” the implementation of this campaign became the 
primary goal of Naxalite cadres throughout India.72  While it did succeed in driving off 
the landowning elite in some of the affected areas, the sadistic nature of the killings 
eventually alienated many more of the peasants than it inspired.73  
The tactics that Mazumdar prescribed for the execution of the annihilation 
strategy were similarly self-defeating.  Believing that an obsession with the acquisition of 
firearms would only distract the peasants from their spontaneous revolutionary zeal, he 
initially forbade their use by any but the party’s leadership, and even these he limited to 
purposes of self-defense.  In the application of the terror campaign, the cadres were only 
permitted to use traditional weapons like spears, sickles, and bows and arrows.  His 
emphasis on decentralization also stressed the primacy of village level squads, usually of 
no more than seven members, at the expense of larger formations of fighters.74  Though 
he later paid lip service to the need for organizing a ‘People’s Liberation Army’ along 
more conventional lines, there was never any serious attempt to form such a force.75  
These tactical decisions left the Naxalites at a decided disadvantage against the 
comparatively well armed and organized government security forces that eventually 
moved in to counter them.  
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For all their operational errors, however, a temporarily accommodating political 
climate allowed the Naxalites to embark on a series of campaigns that caused no small 
amount of instability in the regions they affected.  From the formation of the party in 
1969 until July of 1971, they were a force to be reckoned with in a number of Indian 
states.                     
3. Naxalite Activity 
While Naxalite activity and violence in this period were reported from as far 
afield as Jammu and Kashmir, Rajasthan, the Punjab, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, and 
Kerala, the bulk remained confined to West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh.76  It was in 
these two states that the annihilation program was most effectively implemented and 
where the Naxalites had their greatest political impact.  Perhaps surprisingly, the first 
large-scale campaign after Naxalbari came not in West Bengal, but in Srikakulum district 
of Andhra Pradesh. 
Srikakulum’s history of peasant unrest predated the Naxalites, emerging as early 
as 1961 in the form of agitation by the native Girijan tribals against the economic 
oppression of the landholding class.  While this was usually relatively peaceful, the 
example and influence of Naxalbari soon turned it violent. By late 1968, under the 
leadership of a number of imported Naxalite cadres, the Girijans were becoming 
increasingly militant.  In 1969, they embarked on a classic annihilation campaign for 
political control, killing more than 150 people and eventually extending their writ over 
more than 500 square miles.  While Mazumdar’s hopes were high for this “liberated 
area,” the movement proved more fragile than it appeared.  Coordinated action by the 
security forces resulted in the deaths or arrests of top Naxalite leaders in the district, and 
Girijan support for the insurgency dissipated by mid-1970.77 
In late 1969, the Naxalites launched another offensive in the Midnapur district of 
West Bengal.  Like Srikakulum, it was a classic annihilation campaign with exclusively 
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political aims.  In Midnapur, however, the leadership that instigated the rebellion was not 
composed of older party cadres, but young students from Calcutta.78  Led by Ashit 
Chatterjee and Santosh Rana, the movement achieved some early success, accounting for 
the deaths of around 100 ‘class enemies’ and considerable economic disruption.  Like 
Srikakulum, however, the uprising proved unsustainable and collapsed in the face of 
pressure from the security forces in early 1970.79 
Birbhum in West Bengal, Muzzafarpur in Bihar, and the Palia district of Uttar 
Pradesh also witnessed organized Naxalite activity in 1969-1970.  Like all the other rural 
uprisings, however, their early intensity masked fundamental weaknesses, and they died 
out almost as dramatically as they had flared up.80  Ironically, Naxalism’s last major 
campaign in this period occurred not in the countryside, but in Calcutta.  Perhaps in 
desperation at the failures of its rural campaigns, the CPI-(ML) made an abrupt strategic 
reversal and launched a “cultural revolution” in West Bengal’s teeming capital in April 
1970.81  While some observers have described this surprising development as a 
spontaneous movement by the urban Naxalite cadres, it is clear that Mazumdar himself 
guided the emergence of this new front at an early stage.  Initially, the focus of the 
movement was on the destruction of symbols of bourgeoisie culture.  These included 
cinemas, universities, and statues of iconic Indian figures like Mahatma Gandhi.  Within 
a few months, however, the annihilation campaign appeared in Calcutta.  Initially 
targeting police officers, its focus soon shifted to CPI-(M) politicians and activists, and 
even middle-class businessmen.82  The fact that Naxalite violence had now arrived in a 
major city occasioned great alarm throughout the country, not least in New Delhi. 
As the insurgency grew more violent through 1970 and early 1971, however, it 
became apparent that it was losing its ideological focus. In large part, this was due to a 
dramatic shift in the makeup of the party’s membership.  While upper class university 
                                                 
78 Ghosh, 78-79; Dasgupta, The Naxalite Movement, 57. 
79 Singh, 63. 
80 Ibid., 64-74. 
81 Dasgupta, The Naxalite Movement, 68-77. 
82 Ibid., 79-91. 
 27
students had been an important component of the early Naxalite movement, by 1970, 
most had either been arrested or dropped out in revulsion at the excesses of the 
annihilation campaign.  In their place, shiftless youth, petty criminals, and other anti-
social elements had risen to prominence in the urban faction of the CPI-(ML).  Under the 
guise of class struggle, extortion, theft, and personally motivated murders by party cadres 
grew increasingly common.  Unsurprisingly, this did little to endear the Naxalites to the 
majority of Calcutta society.  Already alienated by the statue smashing campaign and 
other  petty vandalism, the public turned decisively against them in 1971.83 
As a result of this string of failures, the ideological cracks in the leadership of the 
CPI-(ML) that had been evident at its founding widened into chasms.  Mazumdar was 
increasingly the target of pointed criticism from other Naxalite leaders on a number of 
issues.84  Prominent among these were his adoption of the annihilation strategy as the 
primary form of struggle, his total neglect of the urban proletariat as a target of agitation, 
and the wisdom of his prohibition of all mass organization -  in short, all the tenets of his 
grand strategy.  To make matters worse, he had also lost the rhetorical support of the 
CPC.  In late 1970, the Chinese government sent a message to Mazumdar echoing many 
of the same criticisms that were emanating from within his own party.85  Shortly 
thereafter, its radio broadcasts in support of the CPI-(ML) ceased.86  Though still 
claiming allegiance to Beijing, Mazumdar diverged from the CPC line in 1971 by vocally 
supporting the uprising in East Pakistan against Yahya Khan’s government.  This proved 
to be the last straw for many other Naxalite leaders, who finally broke ranks with this 
betrayal of China’s ideological direction.87  With the leadership hopelessly divided, the 
rural campaign in tatters, and the lumpen-proletariat dominating the urban scene, the  
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Naxalite movement was foundering badly.  Nevertheless, it would take concerted action 
by the central and state governments to definitively put an end to this era of Naxalite 
activity. 
D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
1. Center Responses 
Initially, the government in New Delhi paid scant attention to the outbreak of 
violence in Naxalbari.  Viewing the situation primarily as a localized law and order 
problem, it did little more than express its opinion to West Bengal that the situation 
should be dealt with swiftly.88  To be fair, in spite of the attention it received as a result 
of the CPC’s endorsement, the early movement was too weak and disorganized to merit 
much more of a reaction.  Even as Naxalism organized and spread through 1968-69, it 
still failed to elicit much of an official response.  As mentioned previously, this was 
probably due to the distraction provided by the leadership battles and other political 
machinations that occupied the center during these years.  By 1970, however, the 
situation was beginning to change. 
The emergence of Naxalite violence in Calcutta, one of India’s largest cities, was 
too worrisome a development to ignore.  On August 11, 1970, Indira Gandhi pronounced 
that the government would fight the Naxalites with “all the strength at its command.”89  
Securing the elections in early 1971 provided a pretext for the deployment of military and 
paramilitary forces to some of the worst Naxal-affected districts.90  In July 1971, the 
center launched Operation Steeplechase, a coordinated campaign by the Indian army, the 
Central Reserve Police Force, and local police across contiguous districts in West Bengal, 
Bihar, and Orissa that were still affected by Naxalite violence.  This area encompassed 
West Bengal’s Midnapur and Birbhum districts, and the cadres still active were largely 
holdovers from those earlier campaign.  While Steeplechase was not a complete success, 
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in that a sizeable number of activists escaped the police dragnet, it did achieve some 
noteworthy results:  hundreds of Naxalites were arrested, large caches of weapons were 
seized, and most importantly, the rural population’s confidence in the strength of the 
government was restored.91         
New Delhi also attempted to undercut the grass-roots appeal of Naxalism by 
championing a number of rural development and land reform schemes.92  The West 
Bengal Land Reform Act, passed in January 1970, was one such initiative.  It imposed 
ceilings on the total acreage individual families were allowed to hold and reduced the 
maximum rent that landlords could charge their sharecroppers.  As usual, the law was 
filled with loopholes, and the ever-present corruption and conflicts of interest severely 
curtailed its overall efficacy.93  Nevertheless, it did help some of the landless poor and 
scored political points at the expense of the Naxalites.   
For all the efforts of the central government, however, Naxal violence remained 
fundamentally a state problem.  India’s Constitution devolved authority over internal 
security to the states, and it was their policies and initiatives that mattered most.94  Of 
course, if a state proved incapable of handling its own affairs, there was a constitutional 
answer for that, too.       
2. State Responses 
In Andhra Pradesh, a determined state government, united under firm Congress 
Party rule, was able to cope with the violence in Srikakulum on its own.  While 
allegations of police brutality and ‘encounter killings’ were common, the swift and 
effective application of force by the state police broke the back of the insurgency there in 
a matter of months.95  The situation in West Bengal was somewhat more complicated.  
With the CPI-(M) occupying key leadership positions in the United Democratic Front 
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government, West Bengal’s response to the emergence of Naxalism was initially quite 
tepid.  This was largely due to infighting between the members of the coalition.  While 
other parties argued for a strong response to the initial outbreak of violence in Naxalbari, 
the CPI-(M) vacillated.  Though it wanted to reign in its adventurist cadres in Siliguri, it 
was fearful of damaging its revolutionary credentials by authorizing too forceful a 
response.  Additionally, the agitators were still members of the CPI-(M) at this stage, and 
the party was hopeful of bringing them back into its fold.  As a result, police actions in 
response to the increasing violence through July 1967 were quite circumscribed.96  By 
the time a deteriorating situation forced the government’s hand in August and September, 
the movement had already attracted a sizeable following.  While the insurrection in 
Naxalbari was effectively put down in a relatively short period of time, the damage had 
been done.   
Though the inability of the UDF to effectively govern forced its dissolution in 
November 1967, mid-term elections returned it to power in February 1969.  With broadly 
the same makeup, it proved even less capable of agreement in policymaking, particularly 
with respect to the Naxalites.  Not only did the government fail to outlaw the movement, 
some of its constituent parties actually sought to curry favor with the Maoists in a bid to 
strengthen their popularity with rural voters.97  Again, this resulted in a generally weak 
security response, with the police budget actually reduced just as the activity in Midnapur 
and Calcutta was beginning to heat up.98  With the coalition hopelessly polarized and the 
security situation deteriorating, New Delhi imposed President’s Rule on West Bengal in 
March 1970. 
President’s Rule, an administrative device under Article 356 of the Indian 
Constitution, allows the center to assume executive authority in a state if the ruling 
government can no longer form a majority in the state legislature.99  With the governor 
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(as an agent of New Delhi) now firmly in charge, the security situation began to improve 
rapidly.  The 1932 Bengal Suppression of Terrorist Outrage Act was quickly revived, 
giving the police expanded powers of detention.100  Funding for the state police forces 
more than doubled, and the number of officers rose dramatically.101  Augmented by 
personnel from the center’s Border Security Force, these additional men were posted to 
hotbeds of Naxalite activity, especially Siliguri, Midnapur, and Calcutta.  In April, a joint 
operation by the Indian military and the Central Reserve Police Force, in coordination 
with state police, successfully put down the Midnapur uprising in a matter of weeks.102  
Though it took a while longer, the expanded presence in Calcutta also proved effective.  
Aided by government sponsored volunteer militias, ironically drawn from the same 
lumpen-proletariat element the Naxalites had utilized, forceful policing resulted in the 
deaths or arrest of thousands of Naxalite cadres and sympathizers.103  As in Andhra 
Pradesh, abuses by the anti-Naxal forces were not uncommon – in one notorious instance, 
300 armed members of a volunteer militia rampaged through a Naxalite stronghold in the 
Cossipore-Baranagore neighborhood of Calcutta, killing nearly 100 suspected Naxalites 
in cold blood.104  Though brutal, the tactics were effective.  By the end of 1971, 
Mazumdar was forced to officially abandon the urban campaign in the face of mounting 
losses.105                
The movement was by this time a spent force, and its fortunes continued to 
decline as top leadership was caught up in the tightening police dragnet through the first 
half of 1972.  Finally, on July 16, 1972, Charu Mazumdar himself was arrested from a 
safe house in the Calcutta suburb of Entally.  On July 28, he died in police custody at the 
age of 54.  The death of Mazumdar was a fittingly symbolic denouement to the 
movement that had burned so brightly for over five years.  With the departure of its 
spiritual and ideological leader, the first phase of Naxalite activity in India was over. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has analyzed the birth, rise, and eventual decline of the Naxalite 
insurgency from 1967-1972.  The emergence of Naxalism in 1967 was ultimately 
attributable to a number of factors.  Persistent poverty and growing inequality in the 
countryside produced a groundswell of discontentment in the poor rural population.  
Deeply frustrated with their government, some peasants and tribals were willing to 
entertain any alternative ideology that promised empowerment and greater equity; though 
it was certainly the most violent, Naxalism was just one of a number of socio-political 
movements that began to emerge at this time.106  Concurrently, political instability 
brought by the initial weakening of the INC’s hegemony provided room for these 
alternative ideologies to grow.  Finally, leftist revolutionary rhetoric was ubiquitous in 
the late 1960s, both domestically and internationally.  This provided a veneer of 
ideological sophistication to a movement that offered little more than violence, and 
allowed it to challenge the state’s legitimacy, at least for a while.       
However, while the Naxalite movement during this period drew much attention 
from the press and occasioned a great deal of worry in New Delhi and elsewhere, it 
seems clear in hindsight that the danger was not as great as many feared at the time.  
Although Naxalism touched almost every part of the country from 1967-1972, its 
activities were widely dispersed, and it never controlled more than 200 of India’s 56,000 
rural villages at any one time.107  As militant Communism blossomed throughout much 
of the third world in the late 1960s, it may seem surprising that it failed to gain more 
traction in the Indian context, beset as it was by many of the same socio-economic 
problems evident in Southeast Asia or Latin America.  In the final analysis, much of the 
responsibility for the ultimate failure of the Naxalite movement in this period must be 
laid at the feet of Charu Mazumdar. 
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The man regarded as ‘India’s Mao Zedong" proved to be a much less competent 
leader than his Chinese namesake.  Ideologically, his blind application of the Chinese 
revolutionary model to India overlooked fundamental differences between the two 
countries.  India’s governmental apparatus was much more powerful than its Chinese 
counterpart had been in the late 1940s.  The institution of parliamentary democracy had 
become well entrenched in India, and it would take more than temporary economic 
hardships to undermine its widespread support.  Additionally, despite its faltering in the 
elections of 1967, the Congress Party proved to be enduringly popular.  The INC was 
granted an impressive mandate in the 1971 and 1972 elections at both the state and 
national levels, demonstrating that it retained the support of a majority of the Indian 
population.108  Therefore, while Mazumdar correctly identified the rising levels of 
discontent in Indian society, he totally misread the resultant potential for a rapid 
revolution.  The majority of India’s peasants were concerned with local social and 
economic issues, and remained unmoved by Naxalite political ideology. 
As it turned out, most of Mazumdar’s strategic and operational initiatives actually 
proved counterproductive in winning over India’s masses.  His single-minded focus on 
the seizure of political power and utter contempt for mass organization precluded the 
development of any socio-economic agenda that might have been useful in garnering 
broad rural support.  While this was supposed to be achieved through the application of 
the annihilation campaign, the brutality of this program actually alienated the majority of 
peasants.  When it was extended to urban areas during the Calcutta campaign, it had the 
same effect on most city residents; the ill-conceived “cultural revolution” and the 
excesses of the lumpen-proletariat faction only exacerbated this revulsion.  In the end, 
Mazumdar’s strategic choices effectively denied his movement any base of popular 
support.   
Nor did he better acquit himself in his tactical formulations.  The curious 
prohibition on firearms left his cadres woefully outgunned by the military and police.  
Additionally, his penchant for decentralization severely restricted the Naxalites’ ability to 
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adapt to changing military circumstances.  Even as the scale of the government’s security 
operations grew from 1967-1972, the Maoists continued to emphasize small, village-level 
units at the expense of a more sizeable and coherent military organization.  Time and 
again, these proved incapable of mounting an effective resistance to the larger, better 
equipped, and more highly organized forces arrayed against them.    
While Mazumdar’s inept leadership set the stage for the movement’s demise, the 
overall effectiveness of the government’s response must also be acknowledged.  With the 
exception of the UDF initiatives in West Bengal, robust and forceful responses by state 
and central security forces were eventually successful in putting down all the uprisings.  
While these did involve a number of human rights abuses, the growing public disgust 
with Naxalite violence meant that most Indians seemed to accept these aggressive 
policing methods.109  Simultaneously, all levels of government increased funding for land 
reforms and rural development programs in an effort to address the socio-economic 
inequities that had helped spark the outbreak of violence.  While these did not always 
work as they were intended, they did succeed in winning back the support of the rural 
poor.      
The final contributor to the failure of the Naxalite movement in this period was its 
overall organizational weakness.  Mazumdar’s charismatic personality had papered over 
the movement’s fissiparous tendencies in 1967, but these forces could not be contained 
for long.  Ideological differences and powerful egos erupted again in late 1970, and the 
leadership had irrevocably fractured by 1972.  The CPI-(ML) splintered into a number of 
different factions, including the Maoist Communist Centre, the Proletarian Party, and a 
grouping of the CPI-(ML)’s Regional Committees of West Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa.110  
Along with Dakshin Desh and the Nagi Reddy Group, these localized, weakened, and 
divided organizations would be the diminished face of Naxalism through its next period 
of activity, 1972-1991.      
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III. THE FRAGMENTARY PERIOD (1972-1991) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 1972, the Naxalites emerged from the failures and setbacks at the end of the 
Organizational Period in a critically weakened state:  their founder and most influential 
leader, Charu Mazumdar, was dead; their surviving leadership was rotting in jail after a 
brutally effective government crackdown; their activists were disillusioned and 
demoralized after a succession of defeats; and the excesses of revolutionary zeal had 
alienated them from the vast majority of the Indian public.  Given this litany of woes, 
most observers could be forgiven for assuming that the movement was as good as dead. 
As it turned out, the flame ignited at Naxalbari had not extinguished – it was, 
however, reduced to a smoldering ember that was very nearly snuffed out over the course 
of the next two decades.111  The years from 1972-1991 unquestionably marked the nadir 
of the Naxalite movement in India.  Battered by the government’s security forces in the 
previous period, it desperately needed to reunify and consolidate its position.  Instead, it 
was repeatedly fragmented by disagreements over ideological abstractions, strategic 
formulations, and even personal egos.  The result was a proliferation of small, localized 
groups that proved utterly incapable of mounting any effective challenge to the Indian 
government.  In short, the story of the Naxalites in this period is a rather boring one 
compared to the events of 1965-1972.              
It is, nonetheless, one worth examining.  For the purposes of analyzing 
Naxalism’s resurgence after 1991, this period is important on three counts.  First, it acted 
as a bridge between the two periods of relatively high Naxalite activity.  Secondly, it 
gave rise to the factions that turned into the dominant Naxalite groups of the current era; 
clearly, any study of these organizations must take into account the circumstances of their 
birth.  Lastly, determining the reasons for the movement’s inability to gain traction in the 
past should help in prescribing effective ways to counter its spread in future.      
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B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
1. Political Developments 
The 1970s and 80s were a transitional period in Indian politics.  The instability of 
1965-1971, discussed in the preceding chapter, was the first indication that the institution 
of one-party hegemony known as the ‘Congress System’ was not as unshakeable as it had 
previously appeared.112  Though Indira’s party enjoyed landslide victories at the state and 
national levels in 1971 and 1972, successfully consolidating the INC and the country 
under the banner of her leadership, this apparent return to the stability of the old 
‘Congress system’ belied a number of emerging structural changes in the Indian polity.  
Chief among these were the increasing politicization of lower and middle classes and 
castes, the rising importance of local-level issues, and the resultant emergence of regional 
and state level parties.  While these processes evolved gradually, they set the stage for the 
tremendous changes that would occur on the Indian political scene in the 1990s, and 
helped make politics in these two decades more complex than it had been in the past.  
Though a thorough examination of these phenomena is outside the scope of this thesis, 
they indirectly impacted the course of Naxalism in a number of ways.113 
One was through political developments in New Delhi.  As previously alluded, 
Congress (I) emerged in 1972 with firm control of the national government.  In light of 
the changing political scene, the party was remarkably effective in maintaining its grip on 
power for the remainder of this period, only relinquishing it during two brief interludes of 
Janata Party-led coalition government, in 1977-1980 and 1989-1991.  In retrospect, this 
success was largely due to Indira’s political guile and capacity for heavy-handed 
authoritarianism.  Recognizing that anti-colonial nationalism was no longer an effective 
rallying cry for the masses, she sought to mobilize support by turning to a more populist 
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message.114  Though Congress remained the party of India’s industrial classes, it also 
began to reemphasize its socialist roots.  Throughout the 1970s and early 1980s, 
agricultural development, poverty reduction, and economic self-sufficiency featured 
prominently in Congress’ platform, successfully attracting significant portions of the 
lower classes and castes.115  This shift in message did more than win elections – it also 
boosted the government’s legitimacy with India’s poor, thereby undercutting the appeal 
of alternative ideologies like Naxalism. 
When rhetoric proved insufficient in maintaining Congress hegemony, however, 
the party was not averse to taking more extreme measures.  The imposition of the 
‘Emergency’ from June 1975 to March 1977 demonstrated this most strikingly.  Faced 
with declining popularity and a series of legal challenges to her rule, Mrs. Gandhi 
temporarily abrogated the constitution, suspended all civil rights, jailed opposition 
political figures, and instituted martial law throughout the country.116  Though 
democracy and the rule of law were reinstated with the national elections in 1977, Indira, 
and the Congress Party more generally, showed themselves more than willing to deal 
harshly with political opposition.  As we will see, this resulted in a usually muscular 
response to separatist movements and other insurrections, including those of the Naxalite 
groups. 
Developments at the state level were also important.  Throughout the early 1970s 
and the period of the Emergency, Congress governments retained power in the vast 
majority of the Indian states.  However, after the INC’s temporary defeat at the center in 
1977, the number and influence of state-level parties accelerated dramatically.  
Significantly, this phenomenon began in those areas most affected by Naxalism during 
the previous period, with the emergence of the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) in Andhra 
Pradesh and the resurgence of the CPI-(M) in West Bengal.117  The growth of these 
parties, many of which depended on tenant farmers and landless laborers for their 
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primary constituencies, gave a new political voice to groups that had been effectively 
disenfranchised in the past.  Their inclusion in the political process helped keep rural 
unrest in check and brought an added impetus for meaningful action on economic issues 
that were dear to this large demographic.   
2. Economic Developments 
India’s economy during this period was something of a mixed bag.  At the macro 
level, Congress’ socialist policies, the persistence of an overbearing public sector 
epitomized by the ‘License Raj’ and a strategy of import-substitution industrialization 
introduced significant distortions in the economy that stifled growth the country so 
desperately needed.  While overall GDP increased at an average of 3.5 percent 
throughout the 1970s, an exploding population meant the corresponding rate per capita 
was only 1.3 percent, far below that of the rest of the developing world.  Though tepid 
attempts at liberalization resulted in slightly higher growth rates in the 1980s, their 
incomplete nature resulted in a balance of payments crisis that ultimately proved 
unsustainable and precipitated the economic reforms of the 1990s.118  On the other hand, 
the benefits of the Green Revolution were finally becoming more evenly distributed, and 
Congress’ newfound political populism translated into a slew of rural and agricultural 
development initiatives and aid programs.119  For the country’s poor farmers at least, the 
picture was finally becoming a bit brighter.  
Indira’s initial reforms after the 1971 elections were ambitious in scope and 
included land-reform legislation, rural employment programs, nationalization of food 
markets, and investment in transportation infrastructure designed to help farmers get their 
product to market.  These were consolidated in the country’s Fifth Five Year Plan, 
launched in 1974, the explicit aims of which were the “removal of poverty” and the 
“attainment of economic self-reliance.”  For all its optimism, the plan’s designs were 
complicated by the same corruption and conflicts of interest that had plagued reform 
efforts in previous eras.  Additionally, the worldwide oil shocks of the early 1970s 
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brought massive inflation that substantially diminished economic growth in real terms.  
Bihar and Gujarat erupted in riots and protests at the diminishing economic situation, and 
a national railroad strike threatened to bring the country to a standstill and compound its 
economic problems.120 
Though political factors contributed more directly to the imposition of the 
Emergency in 1975, Indira used her newfound power to tackle the economic challenges 
facing the country.  Her ‘Twenty-Point Program’ of economic development was very 
similar to the country’s Fifth Five Year Plan, but with political opposition sidelined, Mrs. 
Gandhi was able to force its implementation more effectively.121  For all its 
authoritarianism, the Program was remarkably successful in getting the economic 
situation under control and finally bringing some relief to farmers and the rural poor.  
Inflation was successfully tamed, food prices retreated to their 1971 levels, and 
agricultural investment and subsidies began reaching the people that truly needed 
them.122       
When the Emergency was repealed and the Janata government came to power in 
1977, the coalition proved so weak and the government so ineffectual that economic 
problems returned almost immediately.  Inflation and unemployment skyrocketed, and 
Congress returned to power in 1980 with the slogan “Elect a Government that Works!”123  
Though she initially tried to cut agricultural subsidies, the political backlash convinced 
Indira and her party that the rural interests would still have to be placated.  The Sixth Five 
Year Plan brought numerous anti-poverty initiatives like the Integrated Rural 
Development Program and the National Rural Employment Program, and inaugurated 
huge agricultural subsidies that continued throughout the 1980s.124 In sum, while overall 
economic performance throughout this period was relatively mediocre, the numerous 
development initiatives meant the plight of the rural poor ceased to deteriorate as it had 
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from 1965-1972.  In fact, the rural poverty rate declined relatively dramatically over this 
period, from 56% in 1973 to only 39% by 1988.125  This is not to imply that these 
programs were unqualified successes; corruption and conflicts of interest continued to 
hamper their implementation, and their benefits were far from uniformly distributed.  
Nevertheless, they were successful enough to alleviate some of the income disparities 
that had stoked the fires of Naxalism in the previous period, and diminished economic 
and class issues as a source of social unrest.126 
3. Social Developments 
Despite the attenuation of economic inequity as a source of social strife, the 1970s 
and ‘80s witnessed the birth of new ethnic and religious cleavages in India’s 
heterogeneous society, precipitating the rise of a number of new communal and 
secessionist movements.  Though none of these were directly connected to the 
phenomenon of Naxalism, their emergence and the government’s response did have 
implications for the Maoists’ fortunes.  Two of the most prominent of these movements 
occurred in the Punjab and India’s wild Northeast. 
In the late 1970s, a wave of unrest swept India’s ‘Seven Sisters,’ the small and 
predominantly tribal states east of the Siliguri corridor.  While the trouble started in 
response to an influx of Bengali refugees in the wake of the 1971 Indo-Pak War, it soon 
took on a distinctly separatist character.127  Historically, the region had only the loosest 
association with the rest of the subcontinent and was much more culturally bound to 
neighboring areas of Burma than to the rest of India.  By the early 1980s, the Assamese, 
Bodo, Naga, and Mizo peoples had launched a series of violent secessionist movements, 
many of which continue to the present day.  In response, New Delhi imposed martial law 
and dispatched the military and central police forces to put down the rebellions.  Rajiv 
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Gandhi was able to negotiate a temporary suspension of hostilities in the late 1980s, but 
the arrangements soon fell apart, with the military redeployed to the Northeast in force by 
1990.128   
On the other side of the country, another, even bloodier secessionist movement 
emerged at roughly the same time. The Sikh community had agitated for a separate Sikh 
nation, notionally known as Khalistan, since around the time of Partition and 
Independence in 1947.  The movement had been largely peaceful in the intervening 
decades, but by the late 1970s, it was becoming more belligerent.  Under the leadership 
of J. S. Bhindranwale, a Sikh religious guru, armed members of the separatist Akali Dal 
Party stormed the Golden Temple at Amritsar in a direct challenge to New Delhi’s 
authority.  In response to the rising violence and lawlessness throughout the Punjab, 
Indira’s actions were swift and uncompromising.  In June of 1984, the Indian Army 
launched ‘Operation Bluestar,’ retaking the Golden Temple by force and inflicting 
massive casualties on its Sikh defenders.129  The operation cost Mrs. Gandhi her life (she 
was shortly thereafter assassinated by two of her Sikh bodyguards) and did not end the 
Khalistan movement immediately.  It did, however, set the tone for the center’s response 
through the remainder of the decade.130  Extremely aggressive security actions continued, 
and ultimately proved successful in putting down the insurrection by the early 1990s. 
For the Naxalites, the impact of unrest in the Punjab and the Northeast was 
twofold.  First, it seems likely that the threats to the integrity of the nation served to rally 
significant portions of the electorate to the government, giving New Delhi an added 
source of legitimacy.  Much as the government enjoyed a boost of popularity in 1971-72 
during the Indo-Pak war, the actions against the animist tribals and (especially) the Sikhs 
played well with India’s majority Hindu polity.131  This doubtlessly helped curtail the 
popularity of an anti-government ideology like Naxalism.  Second, and perhaps more 
importantly, the aggressive response to each of these movements presented a daunting 
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challenge to any other would-be troublemakers.  As historian Stanley Wolpert notes, 
“The stunning, shocking violence of Operation Bluestar served to put every minority in 
India on immediate notice of just how dangerous continued opposition to Delhi could 
be.”132  The Naxalites could certainly be included as one of these minority groups.  As 
we shall see, however, the most potent enemy of Naxalism in this period was the internal 
disarray of the movement itself.         
C. INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY 
1. Organization and Leadership 
Following the death of Charu Mazumdar in 1972, the Naxalites underwent a 
process of fragmentation that severely crippled the movement over the ensuing decades.  
Though their total numbers stayed relatively steady, with most estimates in the 
neighborhood of 15,000 activists nationwide, the leadership was increasingly driven by 
ideological and operational differences of opinion.133  While the failures of the previous 
period were the immediate catalyst for this phenomenon, the movement had displayed 
factionalist tendencies almost from its inception.   
At the organizational meetings of the AICCCR in 1969, two groups parted ways 
with the nascent CPI-(ML) from the outset.  The first of these was the Andhra faction of 
Naxalites under the leadership of Nagi Reddy.  Reddy differed with Mazumdar’s 
formulations on a number of points, most crucially the blanket ban on elections and the 
single-minded emphasis on the annihilation strategy at the expense of economic struggles 
and mass organization.134  After being disaffiliated from the AICCCR, Reddy formed his 
own organization in 1969, the Andhra Pradesh Revolutionary Communist Committee 
(APRCC).  While the APRCC was initially larger than the CPI-(ML), Reddy’s arrest in 
late 1969 severely curtailed its activities.135  In the 1970s, the APRCC broke up into a 
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number of smaller organizations, the two most significant of which were the Unity Center 
of Communist Revolutionaries of India (UCCRI) led by Nagi Reddy himself and 
Chandra Pulla Reddy’s Revolutionary Communist Center (RCC).136  While both groups 
were marginally active in Andhra Pradesh through the 1970s, they underwent numerous 
splits themselves in the latter half of the decade.  By 1990, these smaller groups had 
either withered to inconsequence or been absorbed by other Naxalite outfits.   
The other faction that split from the AICCCR in 1969 was known as Dakshin 
Desh.  Its leaders, Amulya Sen and Kanai Chatterjee, also disagreed with Mazumdar over 
the necessity of mass organization and established their own group, initially based in 
West Bengal.  With the government crackdowns of 1970-71, Dakshin Desh moved its 
operations to Bihar, changing its name to the Maoist Communist Center (MCC) in 
1975.137  Though relatively small, the MCC remained a more or less coherent 
organization over the course of these two decades.  
The same could certainly not be said for Charu Mazumdar’s CPI-(ML).  The party 
had always been a relatively fragile construct of disparate personalities and ideologies, 
but after the setbacks of 1971-1972, it underwent a dizzying process of fractionalization 
that resulted in the emergence of literally dozens of competing groups.  As the smaller 
organizations were often short-lived and of little real significance in the future 
development of the movement, only the most important will be enumerated here.    
Following Mazumdar’s death in 1972, the CPI-(ML) split into two broad camps:  
those who supported his ideology, strategy, and tactics, and those who opposed them.  
The pro-Mazumdar camp was further divided in 1973, with Lin Biao’s fall from grace in 
the Chinese Communist Party.  A source of great inspiration for Mazumdar’s ideology, 
his disavowal by the Chinese generated contentious ideological debate within this branch 
of Naxalism.138  The pro-Mazumdar/pro-Lin Biao faction, a distinct minority, regrouped 
in West Bengal under the leadership of Mahadev Mukherjee.139  The pro-Mazumdar/anti-
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Lin Biao faction emerged in Bihar as CPI-(ML) Liberation, and in Andhra Pradesh as the 
Central Organizing Committee CPI-(ML), or COC-(ML).140  The COC-(ML) would 
itself split in 1977, with one faction, led by Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, reestablishing 
itself in 1980 as CPI-(ML) People’s War Group, or PWG, in Andhra Pradesh.141     
Among the anti-Mazumdar camp, the shakeout in this period was somewhat less 
confusing.  The largest group emerged under the leadership of Satyanarayan Singh, the 
erstwhile Secretary of the CPI-(ML)’s Bihar State Committee.  Singh had fallen out with 
Mazumdar in late 1971 over the latter’s authoritarian tendencies and seemingly suicidal 
tactical injunctions.  In November of that year, Singh and a number of similarly 
disenchanted leaders formed a parallel leadership and actually expelled Mazumdar from 
his own party.142  Though most of the Naxalite rank-and-file did not initially accept this, 
Singh attracted a sizeable following after Mazumdar’s passing.  His organization, known 
as CPI-(ML) S.N. Singh, was the largest and most influential of the post-Mazumdar 
Naxalite groups in the 1970s.143  The only other sizeable anti-Mazumdar group to emerge 
was Bihar’s CPI-(ML) Unity Committee, led by Khokan Mazumdar (no relation to 
Charu).  In 1982, this group merged with the Bihar faction of the COC-(ML) to form the 
CPI-(ML) Party Unity, with Naveen Prasad as its new leader.144 
While the proliferation of groups in this period might give an impression of 
vitality, the splintering of the movement was actually indicative of a great deal of 
uncertainty and acrimony in the ranks.  While all still agreed on the need for a Maoist-
inspired political revolution in the country, Mazumdar’s death and the fallout from the 
failures of the 1965-1972 period had left the Naxalites confused and quarrelsome, on 
issues both practical and ideological.  Cries of ‘revisionism’ by one group were answered 
with counteraccusations of ‘left-adventurism’ from another.  The resultant infighting left 
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the cadres demoralized and the leadership even more hopelessly divided.145  Perhaps no 
issue generated more contention than the most appropriate strategy to pursue in the post-
Mazumdar era. 
2. Strategy and Tactics 
Following the security crackdowns in 1971-72, most of the Naxalite groups 
initially continued to advocate a violent strategy.  With the memories of government 
repression fresh in their minds, this was not altogether surprising – most of their leaders 
continued to languish in prison, often under harsh conditions.  Dakshin Desh and the pro-
Lin Biao faction in West Bengal were particularly vociferous in their agitation for a 
continuation of the annihilation policy.  The other groups placed more rhetorical 
emphasis on building up mass organizations, but they too were initially unwilling to 
forswear armed struggle against the hated oppressors.146  However, with the end of the 
Emergency and the rise of the first Janata government, a more moderate position began to 
emerge within a key segment of the Naxalite movement. 
The CPI-(ML) S.N. Singh was the first major organization to change tack.  
Negotiating with Janata politicians from his jail cell after the 1977 elections, Singh’s 
aversion to electoral politics and compromise with the state softened.  In a surprise move, 
he released a press statement in April 1977 expressing his “critical support” for the new 
Janata government and vowing that his group would participate in the assembly elections 
of June of that year.147  The formerly staunch advocate of the annihilation strategy went 
so far as to announce, “We wish to state categorically here that violence is not our 
ideology.  Our ideology is Marxism-Leninism.”148  Though he justified this ideological 
reversal on the grounds that it would secure the release of political prisoners and enable 
the Maoists to present their platform to more of the population than ever before, his move 
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was viewed as treason by the rest of the movement.149  However, when the Janata 
government delivered on its promises of clemency and one of Singh’s candidates was 
actually elected in West Bengal (Santosh Rana, formerly the leader of the Midnapur 
uprising), his approach was vindicated in the eyes of many Naxalites.  Even such old-
school stalwarts as Kanu Sanyal and Ashim Chatterjee eventually gave Singh’s strategy 
their grudging endorsement.150 
Throughout the rest of the 1970s and 80s, CPI-(ML) Liberation and various lesser 
organizations followed the CPI-(ML) S.N. Singh’s lead and slowly moderated their 
stance.  To be sure, it took time for the incidences of violence to diminish, and many of 
these groups stressed that they still retained the option of armed revolution.151   
Nevertheless, they increasingly normalized their activities, allying themselves with leftist 
political parties and contesting elections at the state level through front organizations in 
Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal.152  For other groups, however, rapprochement 
with any government forces, whatever their political stripes, remained anathema. 
The MCC, COC-(ML), and CPI-(ML) Unity Committee acknowledged the need 
for a greater emphasis on mass organization, but only in support of armed agrarian 
revolution.153  The latter two organizations splintered in the late 1970s, but their 
descendants carried on their two-pronged strategy of mass mobilization and violent 
opposition in the subsequent decade.  Both the PWG and Party Unity continued the 
killing of jotedars and other class enemies, but not as single-mindedly as the CPI-(ML) 
had in the past.  They also established aboveground organizations to agitate for land 
reform and minimum wages, and began setting up parallel administrations to dispense 
justice and other government functions that were lacking in the remote areas where they 
operated.154  Interestingly, the PWG was also able to attract some support by waging a 
                                                 
149 Dasgupta, “The Naxalite Movement: An Epilogue,” 14-15. 
150 Prakash Singh, 123. 
151 Ibid., 158. 
152 Tilak, 19-20; Prakash Singh, 123. 
153 Prakash Singh, 123.   
154 Ibid., 133-134. 
 47
campaign against social vice in the villages, which included crusades against 
drunkenness, gambling, and prostitution.155  Despite their avowed commitment to a 
similarly multi-pronged approach, the MCC was generally less successful in these 
secondary endeavors.  During the 1980s, the group was best known for the gruesome 
nature of its continuing annihilations, still directed primarily at upper caste landlords.156 
At the tactical level, those groups espousing violence began implementing more 
realistic methods in their continued pursuit of armed revolution.  Discarding the Charuist 
aversion to modern weaponry, most actively encouraged the capture of guns from 
jotedars and police.157  While this slowly improved the Naxalites’ firepower, their 
operations remained dominated by small squad-level actions, and were generally 
unsophisticated in terms of their planning and execution.  In the late 1980s, the PWG did 
receive some training from LTTE rebels in more advanced tactics, including the use of 
explosives.  This enabled them to successfully carry out a land-mine attack against police 
forces in 1989, providing a deadly portent of things to come.158  For the most part, 
however, major improvements in the Maoists’ operational capabilities would not come 
until well into the next decade. 
3. Naxalite Activity 
As fundamental as it was, the split between those groups that followed the Singh 
line of political normalization and those that continued with the strategy of violence was 
just one of a host of divisions that spread like a cancer through the movement.  Even 
groups on the same side of the strategic divide remained pitted against one another over 
issues of personality or ideology, and fratricide was not uncommon.159  In this 
contentious environment, there was little hope of consolidation or cooperation.  Split as 
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they were into numerous smaller groupings, the Naxalites’ activity in this period was 
generally circumscribed and remained restricted to a few small geographic areas.   
Throughout the early and mid-1970s, a combination of effective security efforts 
and the imprisonment of most of the leadership put a stop to almost all violent Naxalite 
activity.  Indeed, brief periods of unrest were recorded in only two places:  northern West 
Bengal and Bhojpur district in Bihar.  The agitation in West Bengal erupted in 1973, led 
by the pro-Mazumdar/pro-Lin Biao faction of Mahadev Mukherjee.  For about a year, 
actions against police forces resulted in several dozen deaths and the seizure of a similar 
number of firearms, but the uprising fizzled with Mukherjee’s arrest towards the end of 
1974.160  The activity in Bhojpur was slightly longer lived, lasting from 1972-1977, and 
was led by CPI-(ML) Liberation.  Still committed to violent revolution at this stage, the 
group carried out a number of annihilations against class enemies with the support of 
local tribes.  Still, the uprising was a small-scale affair, accounting for only around ninety 
deaths over the entire five-year period, with its longevity due more to the state 
government’s anemic response than the actual strength of the insurgency.  Like its 
counterpart in West Bengal, it was put down relatively easily with the introduction of 
more aggressive security measures, this time from the center.161 
The late 1970s witnessed the dramatic announcements of Satyanarayan Singh and 
the political normalization of a number of Naxalite groups.  Though gradual, this proved 
to be an enduring phenomenon, and the CPI-(ML) S.N.Singh and its followers largely 
retreated from violent activities.  Though still active politically, their strategic course 
change effectively removed them from the Naxalite fold by the early 1980s, at least for 
the purposes of this thesis.  As for the more recalcitrant Maoists, two dozen smaller 
groups remained minimally active in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, and a 
number of southern states.162  Between them all, however, they accounted for only a 
handful of incidents and even fewer deaths.  Throughout the 1980s, the only groups of 
                                                 
160 Ghosh, 175-177. 
161 Prakash Singh, 117-119. 
162 Ibid., 124. 
 49
any real significance were the PWG in Andhra Pradesh, and what the Indian security 
official Prakash Singh dubbed the ‘New Left’ in Bihar.163 
Formed in April 1980 by Kandapalli Seetharamaiah, the PWG quickly became the 
most powerful Naxalite organization in the country.  Though this latter fact was 
admittedly not much of a boast during this period, they were a disruptive influence in 
their primary area of operations, the perennially restive and underdeveloped Telangana 
region.164  While the group did engage in rudimentary social projects and set up a 
number of peasant organizations to help mobilize the masses in pursuit of economic 
goals, Seetharamaiah was also a firm believer in Mazumdar’s annihilation strategy.  As 
Table 1 shows, the group grew 
increasingly violent under his 
leadership, with attacks on 
jotedars, police, and police 
informants.165  Though still 
relatively contained by the end of 
the 1980s, the PWG was already 
demonstrating the bloody 
ruthlessness that would 
distinguish it in later decades. 
The ‘New Left’ in Bihar 
emerged at roughly the same time 
as the PWG.  Comprised of the 
MCC, Party Unity, and CPI-(ML) 
Liberation, the title may give a 
misleading impression of 
cooperation amongst the groups.  In reality, they fought each other nearly as often as they 
engaged ‘class enemies,’ often in petty squabbles over turf or ideological nuances.  
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YEAR INCIDENTS KILLED 
1981 53 10 
1982 98 18 
1983 172 17 
1984 306 30 
1985 308 30 
1986 161 25 
1987 252 63 
1988 453 59 
1989 456 84 
1990 735 94 
Table 1.   Naxalite Violence in Andhra Pradesh 
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Nevertheless, they too managed to make an impact at the state level.  Like Telangana, 
Bihar remained beyond the reach of many of the government’s reform initiatives, and 
pockets of rural unrest continued to provide havens for Naxalite cadres.166   
Though Liberation was the largest of the three groups, its gradual embrace of 
electoral politics over the course of the decade made it the least violently active.  It 
maintained an armed wing into the 1990s, but its aboveground political organization, the 
Indian People’s Front, increasingly supplanted the influence of its more belligerent 
cadres.167  The faction favoring normalization gained dominance in 1992, and Liberation 
thereafter functioned primarily as an aboveground outfit, focused almost exclusively on 
peaceful mass organization.168  In a telling signal of the extent of their moderation, its 
leaders even called for rapprochement with the formerly despised CPI and CPI-(M), in an 
effort to build a more coordinated leftist political front.169 
By contrast, the MCC and Party Unity remained exclusively committed to armed 
revolution.  Mass organization was desirable, but in the context of a burgeoning caste 
conflict in the state during this period, often difficult to mobilize along exclusively class 
lines.  Instead, the annihilation strategy was pursued with a decidedly grisly purpose, 
particularly by the MCC.  In most cases, upper caste jotedars and their families were the 
primary targets but, with the conflation of caste and class conflicts in the state, the 
sadistic nature of the killings failed to generate the same backlash that had occurred 
previously.  As a result, both the MCC and Party Unity were able to carve out small areas 
of influence in Bihar over the latter half of the 1980s.170  As in Andhra Pradesh, however, 
this level of activity remained a far cry from that of 1967-1972. 
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D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
1. Center Responses 
From the halls of power in New Delhi, Naxalism appeared to be a spent force 
after 1972.  With the center caught up in the drama of systemic political change and the 
growth of ethnic secessionist movements over these two decades, relatively scant 
attention was paid to the fractured and localized Maoist movement in the country.  
Nevertheless, as alluded in Section 3.2, developments at the national level did have an 
impact on the Naxalites. 
With the INC’s turn to a more populist platform, new rural development and land 
reform initiatives effectively undercut the movement’s base of support.  With rural 
inequality receding rather than growing, the more militant cadres had a much harder time 
finding sympathetic base areas from which to operate.  Even for those sections of the 
movement that drifted in a more moderate direction, the government’s schemes were 
successful in stealing their rhetorical thunder and foiling most attempts at mass 
organization; Naxalite candidates did not generally have much success at the polls, 
Santosh Rana’s success notwithstanding.171  While these developments posed indirect 
problems for the Naxalites, a much more immediate challenge emerged with the 
imposition of the Emergency in 1975. 
Though not primarily directed at the Naxalites, the resultant political and security 
crackdowns hit the movement hard.  Like most other opposition groups, all Naxalite 
organizations were banned and scores of leaders and party activists rearrested under the 
newly instituted Maintenance of Internal Security Act (MISA).172  Among them were 
some of the Maoists’ most effective organizers, including Kanu Sanyal, Ashim 
Chatterjee, and Satyanarayan Singh.  Moreover, the security forces were given wide 
latitude in dealing with whatever opposition escaped the prison cell.  Frequently, this 
entailed direct action like that of ‘Operation Thunder,’ which crushed the long-simmering 
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unrest in Bhojpur with combined operations by the military and Central Reserve Police 
forces in 1977.173  Already in tatters after Mazumdar’s death, the Naxalite movement was 
nearly destroyed by the center’s expanded powers during the Emergency.174   
Ironically, it was also New Delhi that granted it a new lease on life.  The Janata 
government’s promises to undo the excesses of the Emergency resulted in the release of 
hundreds of Naxalite prisoners all across the country in 1977 and 1978, the legalization 
of most of their organizations, and the easing of pressure by government security 
forces.175  While this ultimately had the effect of moderating several factions and co-
opting them into the political process, it also freed the more hard-core cadres to resume 
their subversive activities. 
Though the INC returned to power in New Delhi in 1980, it did not resume its 
previous activities against the Naxalites.  In part, this was due to the still extremely weak 
state of the movement.  More importantly, however, the government already had its 
hands full with the growing unrest in Punjab and the Northeast.  Nevertheless, the 
center’s security initiatives with respect to these other regions reverberated among the 
Naxalites.  The extremely aggressive response to these insurgencies likely helped 
convince the more moderate Maoists that the path of armed rebellion was untenable and 
provided some deterrent effect even to their more violent-minded brethren.  Whatever the 
case, Naxalite violence remained at a sufficiently low ebb through the 1980s to permit the 
central government to largely dismiss it as a local law and order problem.  The same 
could not necessarily be said for those states that were more directly affected.              
2. State Responses 
As the birthplace of Naxalism, West Bengal had the longest history in dealing 
with the insurgency.  While effective policing put down the 1973-74 uprising of Mahadev 
Mukherjee’s faction, rural unrest continued to simmer under a series of Congress 
administrations.  When a Left Front coalition government returned to power in 1977, 
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however, the situation changed dramatically.  Led by the CPI-(M), the new 
administration proved much more competent and enduring than its predecessors.  Under 
its direction, West Bengal instituted a series of land redistribution and rural development 
initiatives that proved remarkably successful.  One of these was ‘Operation Barga,’ which 
established strict ceilings on total landholdings by individuals and granted inheritable 
ownership rights to tenant farmers and sharecroppers.176  Unencumbered by the political 
compromises, conflicts of interest, and enforcement issues that so often plagued center-
led efforts, these state-level reforms removed the Maoists’ raison d’etre in a few short 
years.  By the early 1980s, Naxalism had ceased to be a force of any consequence in the 
state.177 
Though not as successful as West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh was able to mount an 
intermittently effective counter to its Naxalite problem.  The TDP, which came to power 
in 1983, initially pursued a policy of appeasement with the PWG in an effort to lure them 
to peace talks.  When it became clear that the group had no intention of negotiating in 
good faith (and had, in fact, used the opportunity to consolidate and strengthen their 
positions), the state’s Chief Minister, N.T. Rama Rao, adopted a hard line against the 
Naxalites.178  Rao authorized aggressive policing measures against PWG cadres and 
oversaw the formation of the Greyhounds, the state’s elite anti-Naxal police unit, in the 
late 1980s.179  Though he supported aggressive security measures, Rao did not neglect 
the rural development initiatives that had proved so successful in West Bengal.  Land 
reform and rural employment initiatives were implemented with moderate success, but a 
lack of government infrastructure in remoter parts of the state made their implementation 
there difficult.180  In 1989, the INC returned to power in state elections, but initially made 
the same early mistakes as the TDP.  The new Chief Minister, Chenna Reddy, tried to 
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appease the PWG in a vain attempt to lure them into the mainstream, releasing several 
hundred Naxalite prisoners rounded up under the previous administration.181  When this 
approach failed again, Reddy reverted to Rao’s combination of tough policing and socio-
economic development.  Despite these ups and downs, the state was relatively successful 
in confining the PWG to the Telangana region and a few neighboring districts throughout 
the 1980s. 
By contrast, the containment of the MCC and Party Unity in Bihar had little to do 
with the state government.  The Janata Party captured control of the state briefly, from 
1977 to 1980, but the remainder of this period was dominated by INC administrations.  In 
reality, however, it scarcely mattered who controlled the government.  Corruption, 
cronyism, and maladministration took root in Bihar in the 1970s and continued to flourish 
through the 1980s.182  Unable to mount effective security or development initiatives of 
any kind, the government essentially left the rural parts of the state to their own devices, 
providing space for the embers of Naxalism to smolder.    While the growth of caste 
conflict in the state, as well as internecine fighting between the MCC and PU, were 
enough to keep the Naxalites more or less in check during these decades, the state’s 
appallingly poor governance would become an issue in the future resurgence of 
Naxalism.                 
E. CONCLUSION   
The Fragmentary Period was a prolonged low point in the history of Naxalism in 
India.  After its brief but significant surge from 1967 to 1972, the movement underwent a 
period of stagnation and decay that lasted nearly two decades and effectively removed it 
from the public consciousness.  Though not as captivating a story as the vitality of the 
previous period, the impotence of the movement and its singular inability to gain traction 
during these years are still worthy of examination.   
                                                 
181 Sanjoy Hazarika, “Indian Rebel Group is Linked to Train Attack,” New York Times, October 21, 
1990. 
182 Prakash Singh, 148-150. 
 55
The most obvious reason for the failure of Naxalism in this period was its own 
organizational weakness.  Fractured into dozens of smaller, competing factions, it was 
too dispersed and fragmented to mount any kind of meaningful challenge to the forces of 
the Indian state.  In large part, this was a failure of leadership.  Consumed by their 
personal egos, strategic and tactical differences, and ideological arguments 
incomprehensible to any but the most dogmatic Marxists, the heads of the various 
Naxalite organizations were utterly incapable of resolving their disputes and coordinating 
the activities of their disparate groups.  As a consequence, a large portion of the 
movement effectively abandoned the revolutionary line, and those that remained were 
confined to a few small pockets of activity in the hinterlands.  With the structure of the 
movement in such a state, its success would have been unlikely in even a permissive 
security environment. 
As it turned out, the security environment was decidedly unfavorable.  The 
imposition of the Emergency in the 1970s granted the state a great deal of leeway in 
dealing with opposition movements, and it used them to devastating affect against the 
already fragmented Naxalites.  Indeed, the movement was very nearly destroyed by 
policing actions like Operation Thunder and the imprisonment of hundreds, if not 
thousands of its activists.  The situation in the 1980s was hardly any better.  Though New 
Delhi’s aggressive reactions to the various secessionist uprisings in the country were not 
directed against the Maoists, they still provided a powerful deterrent effect. 
Lastly, the social, economic, and political conditions in the country were not 
conducive to the spread of Naxalite ideology.  Political changes at the systemic level 
gave a new voice to groups the Maoists traditionally relied on for support, making the 
government more responsive to their needs.  As a result, land reforms and rural 
development became a priority at both the state and national levels.  While these 
programs were not always perfectly implemented, poverty rates did decline, and real and 
perceived inequity were alleviated to some degree.  These issues had been drivers of rural 
unrest in the previous period, and the government’s efforts to address them proved 
generally successful in keeping the countryside peaceful during these decades. 
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To most observers in 1991, the Naxalist threat appeared to be over.  The 
movement had been wiped out in the state of its birth, sizeable numbers of its former 
adherents were embracing electoral democracy, and, with the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, Communism was being discredited around the world.  In isolated pockets of 
Andhra Pradesh and Bihar, however, the embers of the Maoist revolution continued to 
smolder.  In places the rural reforms had scarcely reached, the People’s War Group, 
Maoist Communist Center, and Party Unity continued to cling to existence, waiting for 
the right moment to reignite the fire of Naxalbari. 
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IV. THE RECONSOLIDATION PERIOD (1991-PRESENT) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
With an analysis of the first two periods of Naxalite activity complete, this 
chapter now turns to the most recent iteration of Maoist violence in India.  In an 
examination of the historical evolution of Naxalism, the period from 1991 to the present 
is certainly the most paradoxical.  In the course of little more than 17 years, India has 
transformed from a large, but isolated and relatively weak state, to one of the central 
players in the emerging geopolitical order.  Its macroeconomic growth is astounding, 
second only to China in the developing world, and its diplomatic clout on the world stage 
has increased commensurately.  To many outside observers, India looks to be 
successfully integrating itself into the modern world. 
And yet, in those same 17 years, an archaic Communist ideology, rejected even in 
the place of its birth, was also in the ascendancy.  Written off by most security analysts in 
the ashes of the Fragmentary Period from 1972-1991, Naxalism staged a spectacular 
comeback in the following decades, growing in scope, breadth, and violence.  By 2006, 
its impact was so great that Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was forced to 
declare, “It would not be an exaggeration to say that the problem of Naxalism is the 
single biggest internal security challenge ever faced by our country.”183  This is certainly 
a startling announcement for a nation that suffered through the chaos of Partition, 
witnessed the violence of a Sikh rebellion in the Punjab, and is still confronted by the 
conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, various insurgencies in the Northeast, fundamentalist 
Islamic terrorism, and continuing Hindu-Muslim communal strife.  What explains 
Naxalism’s phoenix-like rebirth in a period that has witnessed such phenomenal growth 
and national development? 
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B. HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
1. Political Developments 
Since 1991, the most striking development in Indian politics has been the 
emergence of a truly multi-polar power structure.  The declining hegemony of the INC 
(discussed in the previous chapter) dramatically accelerated during the 1990s, fuelled by 
the emergence of the “Three M’s” on the political scene:  Mandir, Mandal, and Market 
Reforms.184  In 1998, a Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition unseated the previous 
INC administration and inaugurated the longest period of uninterrupted rule by a non-
Congress party since independence.  Though the INC returned to power in 2004, the 
BJP’s ascendancy in the 1990s definitively marked the end of one-party dominance in 
India, resulting in a more complex and contentious political setting than at any other time 
in the nation’s history.  Minority governments and coalition politics are now the order of 
the day, severely restricting New Delhi’s freedom of action in addressing many pressing 
issues.   
In many ways, this increasing gridlock at the national level is reflected in 
interactions between the central government and those of the states.  India’s political 
structure is distinctly federal, with the 28 state and 7 union territory governments 
retaining high levels of autonomy from New Delhi, barring the infrequent imposition of 
‘President’s Rule’ from the center.  This is particularly true with respect to internal 
security, an area in which the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution of India grants the 
individual states great authority and latitude.185  Such a division of powers presents 
obvious problems for policy coordination, especially when different parties control the 
various levels of government.  This situation was not much of an issue in earlier decades, 
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when most states and territories were firmly under Congress’ control.  Since 1991, 
however, the INC’s continued decline has resulted in smaller parties becoming dominant 
in many more states; significantly, of the 14 states affected by Naxal violence in 2008, 
Congress controls the legislature in only two.  As we will see, this presents a significant 
obstacle to the development of a coherent response to the Naxalite threat. 
For all the dramatic changes to the Indian political structure in recent years, a 
number of institutional weaknesses from earlier periods also pose challenges.  
Corruption, cronyism, and conflicts of interest remain enormous problems.  While some 
progress towards cleaning up administration is visible at the federal level, these problems 
are still quite apparent in many, if not most, lower level governments.  Unsurprisingly, 
they are most pronounced in many of the Naxalite affected states and districts, 
particularly Bihar, Orissa, Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh.186 
One contributing factor to this persistent maladministration is the gross 
inefficiency of the Indian legal system.  Despite a 2005 amendment to the Code of 
Criminal Procedure Act that mandated significant legal reforms, significant problems still 
abound.187  The most pressing of these are corruption within the justice system itself and 
an overwhelming backlog of cases pending adjudication.  Litigation is often held in the 
dock for decades awaiting trial, and powerful interests are frequently able to influence 
court decisions through bribery.188  The lack of recourse to a fair and impartial legal 
system prevents citizens from holding their elected officials accountable or seeking a 
redress of specific grievances, and directly contributes to the growing disaffection of the 
rural poor in many areas. 
2. Economic Developments 
If political changes in India since 1991 are significant, those in the economic 
sphere are almost revolutionary.  The collapse of India’s most important international 
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benefactor, the Soviet Union, coupled with a dramatic rise in world energy prices during 
the first Gulf War, presented enormous challenges to the country’s quasi-socialist and 
isolated economy.   In response, then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh (the current 
Prime Minister), an Oxford educated economist, engineered a series of liberalizing trade, 
investment, and market reforms in an effort to revitalize his nation’s competitiveness.  
The results have been impressive, to say the least.  India’s GDP growth surged from 3-
4% a year in the 1980s to 5-7% throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.189  In 2006, real 
economic growth was 9.2%, second only to China among Asian economies.190  While 
living conditions for most Indians have improved, an emerging urban middle class is the 
largest beneficiary of this growth, rising from less than 10% of the population in the 
1980s to nearly 20% currently.  In a country of over 1.2 billion people, this represents 
over 100 million lifted out of poverty.191   
For all this success, however, poverty remains a persistent problem.  The urban-
rural divide is stark, and while incomes in large cities like New Delhi, Mumbai, and 
Bangalore have grown substantially, the vast majority of India’s population remains 
employed in the agricultural sector, usually with extremely low wages.  A recent study by 
the government-sponsored National Commission for Enterprises in the Unorganized 
Sector revealed that nearly 80% of the Indian population was living on less than U.S. 50 
cents a day (about 20 rupees).192  While corrections for purchasing power parity make 
this statistic somewhat less odious, as of 2006, it still left an estimated 26% of the 
population below the official poverty line of 12 rupees.193   India has endured higher 
poverty rates in the past, but increasing inequality is a new and potentially explosive 
phenomenon.  Whereas the 1980s actually witnessed a reduction of inequality 
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(particularly in rural areas), since the reforms of the early 1990s, the incomes and 
consumption of the richest third of Indian society have grown at a far faster pace than 
those of their poorer neighbors.194  The structure of India’s economic growth is partly to 
blame, as relative declines in manufacturing and agriculture, at the expense of a surging 
services sector, have meant very little net job creation.195  This is a curious feature of the 
country’s economic growth to date and one that may have serious implications for the 
stability of that growth in the future. 
In an effort to address this problem and lure more manufacturing jobs to the 
country, New Delhi recently took steps to further liberalize the investment environment 
and draw more FDI from abroad.  Most notably, in February 2006, India implemented the 
Special Economic Zone (SEZ) Act, allowing the establishment of SEZs (similar to those 
in China) with tax, regulatory, and tariff incentives for foreign invested enterprises.  By 
August 2007, over 230 such zones were approved, with hundreds more in various stages 
of planning.196  The effort enjoyed considerable success, doubling inbound investment 
from U.S. $6 billion in 2005 to over $11 billion in 2006.197  In recent months, however, 
the policy has attracted significant controversy, most pointedly over the issue of land 
appropriation.  The federal and state governments have extensive rights of eminent 
domain, and their often heavy-handed methods for evicting the (usually poor) owners of 
land needed for SEZ development have generated angry protests.  In March 2007, violent 
demonstrations by rural residents in Nandigram, West Bengal, resulted in the deaths of 
14 people when security forces opened fire.198  Though the SEZ policy has since been 
put on hold, it remains a focal point for growing rural disaffection with government 
development policies in the affected regions, particularly West Bengal and Bihar. 
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A third salient feature of India’s recent economic growth is the increasing demand 
for natural resources to fuel this rapid development.  Demand for raw materials of all 
sorts has soared since 1991, particularly for forest products, minerals, and energy.  This 
often results in further conflict between the government and poor rural populations, as 
many of these resources are located on land occupied by this demographic.  Many of 
these areas are also hotbeds of Naxalite activity: Bihar and Jharkhand have extensive iron 
ore deposits; Andhra Pradesh produces bauxite, a key input for aluminum production; 
and over 85% of India’s known coal deposits are located in the five most heavily Naxal-
affected states.199  The fact that India relies overwhelmingly on coal for its electricity 
production (and is already facing serious shortfalls in electrical supply) makes the last 
point all the more sobering. 
The country’s economic development over the past 17 years is certainly 
impressive. However, the uneven nature of this growth, both structurally and 
demographically, poses new challenges for New Delhi.  Nowhere is this more evident 
than in the rising levels of social inequality and unrest in certain segments of the 
population.  
3. Social Developments 
Indian society was never known for its egalitarianism.  The caste system 
institutionalized discrimination centuries ago, with the indigenous tribals (Adivasis) and 
lower castes (Dalits) comprising the bottom rung of the social ladder.  Victimized and 
exploited for generations, it should come as no surprise that these groups are also the 
most left behind, and in many cases directly victimized, by the inequitable economic 
growth discussed above.  In the context of the current Naxalite insurgency, their social 
plight deserves the greatest attention.   
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Accounting for 8.2% of India’s total population, the Adivasis (or Scheduled 
Tribes, STs) are spread out in two broad swathes of territory, one along the southern 
foothills of the Himalaya in northern India and the other in the eastern half of the lower 
peninsula, extending into the seven Northeastern states.  Living in the forests and hills of 
India’s poorest and least developed areas, these groups were ignored by all levels of 
government for decades, with extremely little civil or administrative support in the form 
of schools, hospitals, police, or basic infrastructure.  This neglect is evident in an 
examination of literacy rates, educational attainment, life expectancy, and other 
indicators of human development; by any measure, the Adivasis lag the rest of India by 
wide margins.  The STs are disenfranchised economically, too, with nearly 50% of the 
tribal population below the poverty line.200  Accounting for 16.2% of the overall 
population, the Dalits (or Scheduled Castes, SCs) face similar neglect.  Though spread 
more evenly over the subcontinent, their concentrations are highest in the poorer states 
that, not coincidentally, also comprise the Adivasi homelands.201          
As the demand for natural resources increases, these populations feel a 
disproportionate share of the pressure from developers.  According to the Asian Center 
for Human Rights, a New Delhi based South Asian monitor, despite their small share of 
the overall population, Adivasis “constituted 55.1% of the total displaced persons as a 
result of so called developmental projects like dams, mining, industries, and 
conservation.”202  As mentioned in the same report, Dalits are facing similar denial of 
their land rights.  To make matters worse, the methods by which these dispossessions 
occur are frequently coercive and sometimes violent – Adivasis and Dalits that oppose 
their evictions have faced beatings, rape, and even murder.203  Legal recourse through the 
state judicial system is often unavailable or tainted by corruption, and protection or 
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support from the local administration is usually sorely lacking.  With hostility toward the 
government and its development policies growing in many of these communities since 
1991, it is little wonder that Naxalism would find its new support in precisely this 
demographic. 
C. INTERNAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE NAXALITE INSURGENCY 
1. Organization and Leadership 
Since 1991, a number of organizational factors have contributed to the growing 
strength of Naxalism.  Arguably the most significant of these is the trend toward 
unification.  In the wake of the earlier period of fragmentation, over forty individual 
groups were operating in the eastern half of India. Three in particular emerged as the 
largest and most dangerous offspring of Naxalbari:  the CPI-(ML) People’s War, or 
People’s War Group (PWG), active primarily in Andhra Pradesh and neighboring 
districts of Maharashtra and Madhya Pradesh; the Maoist Communist Center (MCC), 
confined mainly to Bihar (and later Jharkhand); and the CPI-(ML) Party Unity (PU), also 
active in Bihar.  Between the three of them, they accounted for an estimated 80-90% of 
all Naxal-related violence through the 1990s.  Beset by ideological differences, however, 
they were frequently antagonistic when operating in the same areas.204  
An infusion of new leadership in the early 1990s marked the beginnings of a thaw 
between the groups.  In 1992, following the ouster of the legendary PWG leader 
Seetharamaiah, a 42-year-old school teacher, Muppalla Lakshmana Rao (alias 
Ganapathy) took over the reins of a stagnating organization.  Ganapathy set himself apart 
from the old guard almost immediately, with an appreciation of the realities on the 
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could never succeed in its divided state, he immediately set out to bring the various 
factions together, noting, “to advance the cause of the revolution, unification is the only 
way.”205 
Initial merger talks between the PWG and MCC began in 1992, but had broken 
off by 1994.  In 1993, the PWG, MCC, and PU came together on a more limited scale in 
the formation of the All India People’s Forum, ostensibly to coordinate their activities in 
Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, and Maharashtra.206  While this movement enjoyed limited 
success, notably in the organization of a political rally in Hyderabad, the capital of 
Andhra Pradesh, that drew over 100,000 people, ideological divisions forced its 
disassociation by 1996.  Undeterred, Ganapathy pursued rapprochement with the CPI-
(ML) Party Unity on a bilateral basis.  His persistence was rewarded in 1998, when the 
PWG and PU were merged to form the CPI-(ML) People’s War.  For all its prickliness, 
the MCC was not totally averse to the idea of consolidation, as it proved in its merger 
with a smaller faction, the Revolutionary Communist Center of India (Maoist), forming 
the Maoist Communist Center of India (MCCI).  When Ganapathy reached out to the 
MCCI again in 2002, he found them much more receptive.  Negotiations dragged on for 
over two years, but in September 2004, the formation of the CPI-Maoist announced the 
merger of the PW and MCCI factions (in addition to five smaller ones).  While other, 
marginal groups still exist in various parts of the country, given its size, strength, and 
geographical presence, the CPI-Maoist is, for all intents and purposes, the current face of 
Naxalism in India. 
Ganapathy’s successful unification of the different militant factions is 
unprecedented in the movement’s history, eclipsing even Charu Mazumdar’s efforts in 
building the CPI-(ML) in the 1967-1972 period.  The ideological rifts that plagued the 
movement in the past appear to be over.  Significantly, the 9th Unity Congress of the CPI-
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Maoist, held in January-February 2007 (a full 36 years after the last Party Congress), 
presented a united ideological front that reconciled the historic differences of opinion 
among the various parties.207  It also clearly established a unified command structure for 
the organization, with Ganapathy, unsurprisingly, at the top.  The political organization of 
the CPI-Maoist mirrors those of the erstwhile PWG and MCCI, with a Central 
Committee, Regional Bureaus, Zonal or State Committees, District or Division 
Committees, and Squad Area Committees at the local level.208  Militarily, a Central 
Military Commission was established (again, with Ganapathy at the head) to coordinate 
the activities of the party’s People’s Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA), formed from the 
merger of the PWG and MCCI’s respective armed wings.  Constituted shortly after the 
initial merger in December 2004, the PLGA is composed of three types of forces:  the 
Main Force (platoons of regular cadres), the Secondary Force (guerrilla squads), and a 
Base Force (people’s militia).209  The Central Military Commission directs these forces 
through Regional and State/Zonal Military Commissions.210  Higher echelon leadership 
in both the political and military wings rests exclusively with senior cadres, most of 
whom appear fairly well educated.  This is likely a holdover from earlier periods, when 
students and intellectuals were drawn to the movement in fairly substantial numbers.   
Most estimates of the total strength of the PLGA run from 10,000 to 20,000 
armed fighters as of 2006, though figures vary widely.  The Ministry of Home Affairs’ 
Internal Security Report for 2004-05 listed their number at 9,300, with approximately 
6,500 regular weapons.211  Security analyst P. V. Ramana has speculated that they may 
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have as many as 40,000 more full-time cadres.212  Given recent aggressive Naxalite 
drives toward recruitment and arms acquisitions, these numbers are likely to have grown 
considerably in the intervening years.213  The rank-and-file membership is predominantly 
rural, comprised of poor agricultural laborers and tenant farmers, primarily from the Dalit 
and Adivasi communities.  Most are illiterate, and in a number of encounters with 
journalists, their ideological sophistication appeared to be quite basic.214  Leadership 
positions at the platoon and squad level are held almost exclusively by cadres from a 
lower-middle class background with at least a modicum of education (some at the 
collegiate level).215  The ideological fervor of this group appears to be much more 
pronounced.                      
2. Strategy and Tactics 
While the 2004 merger brought much needed coherence to the Naxalite command 
and control structure, it also precipitated a radical and highly effective shift in strategy 
and tactics.  Here again, the influence of Ganapathy’s pragmatism would be difficult to 
overstate.  The CPI-Maoist still adheres to the long-standing Naxalite aim of violently 
seizing political power through an agrarian-based ‘New Democratic Revolution,’ drawing 
heavily from the philosophy of Mao Zedong. This entails, inter alia, a ‘people’s war’ to 
establish ‘liberated zones’ in the countryside, the gradual expansion of these areas until 
the cities are surrounded, and a final push into urban centers, culminating in the 
overthrow of the ‘comprador bureaucrat bourgeoisie’ regime.216  While this overarching 
goal has not changed in the four decades of Naxalism’s existence, the CPI-Maoist’s plans 
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for carrying it out mark a clear break from previous periods.  Eschewing the naiveté of 
Charu Mazumdar’s belief that class-enemy annihilation alone would be sufficient to 
spark an immediate revolution, the CPI-Maoist has embraced the idea of a protracted 
conflict, one likely to last decades, not years.217  To this end, Ganapathy’s strategy 
focuses on the consolidation and expansion of Naxalite controlled territories through a 
number of new methods. 
The first is an attempt to form cross-border and cross-ideological links with other 
insurgent movements in South Asia.  Significant groundwork for this approach was laid 
in 2001, with the formation of the Coordination Committee of Maoist Parties and 
Organizations of South Asia (CCOMPOSA), encompassing Maoist movements in India, 
Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka.218  While CCOMPOSA members have mostly offered 
each other only rhetorical support, the Maoist movements in India and Nepal are an 
exception.  At the first CCOMPOSA meeting, the two groups put forward the idea of a 
‘Compact Revolutionary Zone,’ or ‘Red Corridor’ of contiguous Maoist controlled 
territory stretching from Nepal to Andhra Pradesh.219  Links between Naxalites and the 
CPN extend as far back as the 1990s, with increasing evidence of transfers of manpower 
and materiel from 2003 onward.220   
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The CPI-Maoist has also expressed its support for nationalist struggles in South 
Asia, particularly those in Sri Lanka and India’s Northeast.221  Evidence of a Naxal-
LTTE nexus exists as far back as the mid-1980s, when the PWG received instruction and 
training in the use of explosives from the LTTE.  Despite denials from Ganapathy, many 
analysts believe that the CPI-Maoist still maintains relations with the Sri Lankan 
separatists.222  Proof of an actual connection between the Naxalites and various Northeast 
insurgency movements is much more tenuous, but it appears that on at least one occasion 
the Assamese ULFA provided arms to CPI-Maoist cadres.223 
Another change is the incorporation of economic and infrastructure targets into 
the CPI-Maoist’s agenda.  From 1967 through most of the 1990s, targets of Naxal 
violence were predominantly individuals dubbed ‘class enemies’ – landowners, police 
officers, and politicians.  While these individuals are still targeted, railways, mines, 
power stations, and large industrial complexes are increasingly being hit as well.  
Ganapathy’s recent call to “turn every SEZ into a battlefield” is just the latest 
manifestation of this change in emphasis.224  Most recently, the Naxalites’ coordinated 
blockade in six states across eastern India caused tens of millions $U.S. in damage and 
lost revenue.225  The most recent pronouncements of the CPI-Maoist and CCOMPOSA 
also rail against large multinational corporations, the World Bank, the IMF, and 
(predictably) the United States for what they consider the inherent iniquities of global 
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capitalism.226  Given the dislocations occasioned by India’s economic opening and the 
forces of globalization, these pronouncements doubtless find a receptive audience.        
A third significant shift is a newfound emphasis on mass movements and social 
mobilization.  While precursors to this approach can be found in the aforementioned 1994 
Hyderabad rally, the CPI-Maoist has pursued it much more aggressively.  Formed in 
2005, the Revolutionary Democratic Front, now known as the People’s Democratic Front 
of India (PDFI), is the organizational arm of the CPI-Maoist charged with coordinating 
and organizing mass movements in pursuit of the Party’s political agenda.227  Its efficacy 
was clearly demonstrated in early 2007 by the outbreak of riots and protests against SEZs 
throughout the country, actions the PDFI is alleged to have help organize.228    
On the military side, the Naxalites’ ability to mobilize large segments of the 
population is also evident in their shift to ‘mobile warfare,’ a tactic that first appeared in 
2004.  Utilizing hundreds of its peasant militia to augment a much smaller force of 
regular cadres, the Naxalites are able to overrun well-armed targets like police stations 
through sheer force of numbers.  These swarming tactics have increased substantially in 
recent years, with one in 2004, three in 2005, nine in 2006, and twelve from January-June 
2007.229  The infamous Jehanabad jailbreak in November 2005 was one such attack, and 
resulted in the deaths of four police officers, the release of 341 prisoners, and the seizure 
of large quantities of firearms and ammunition.230  
Indeed, since 1991, Maoist tactics in general have grown more sophisticated and 
violent.    Still armed predominantly with crude homemade weapons in the early 1990s, 
the quality of Naxalite armaments improved substantially throughout the period.  From 
sources in Bangladesh and Nepal, as well raids on police stations, the CPI-Maoist now 
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has access to modern assault rifles, pistols, mortars, and explosives.231  In many Naxal-
affected districts, the cadres are better armed than the security forces.  The use of 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), a staple in the Naxalite arsenal since the late 
1980s, also skyrocketed in recent years, with over 220 successfully detonated from 
January 2004 to September 2005 alone.232  The targets of most of these attacks were 
police vehicles and the occasional politician targeted for assassination.   
The lethality of their operations also shows a marked increase, with the Naxalites 
effectively adapting to police countermeasures.   In late 2005, an armored personnel 
carrier, specifically designed to withstand an IED, was destroyed in Chhattisgarh when 
over 80 kilograms of explosive lifted it 35 feet in the air, killing 24 of the 27 policemen 
inside.233  More conventional attacks also demonstrate greater sophistication and 
coordination, with increasing use of radios and communication equipment that allow the 
cadres to monitor police frequencies.234  In an assessment of recent Naxalite tactics, 
security analyst P.V. Ramana noted, “systematic preparation for an attack, meticulous 
planning, fine execution, a good degree of coordination, launching synchronized attacks 
on multiple targets within a given area and, significantly, involving large numbers of 
cadres, are among the most striking features of this rise in Maoist militarization.”235 
To fund these more ambitious operations, the Naxalites are also proving quite 
adept at more prosaic criminal activities.  Kidnapping for ransom now features 
prominently in their repertoire, with rich businessmen their preferred targets.  Extortion 
of industries operating in their strongholds and drug running are also highly lucrative.  
While more recent figures are unavailable, in 2003, it was estimated that the Naxalites 
took in nearly U.S. $25 million in the state of Bihar alone.236  With the subsequent 
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merger and consolidation of territory in 2004, their annual nationwide haul is now likely 
to be several times larger, giving them ample funding to pursue their more aggressive 
political and military agendas.    
Taken in sum, the strategic and tactical adjustments made by the Naxalites over 
the course of the last decade have been sweeping.  Under Ganapathy’s leadership, they 
are increasingly violent and ambitious.  Just as worryingly, they are also expanding their 
areas of operation. 
3. Naxalite Activity 
As throughout most of the 1980s, the 1990s saw Naxal violence confined 
primarily to northern Andhra Pradesh and southern Bihar.  There, the PWG, MCC, and 
PU factions maintained their positions by working with tribal and lower caste 
communities in the most impoverished parts of the states.237  In these backward districts, 
the writ of the government runs thinly, if at all.  Civil administration (police, courts, 
hospitals, schools, etc.) is practically nonexistent, and the Adivasis and Dalits frequently 
suffer abuse from the landed upper and middle castes.  Capitalizing on this dearth of 
governance, the Naxalites set up alternative administrations in many of these areas, 
dispensing their own versions of governmental and social functions in addition to more 
traditional forced land redistributions.  While the delivery of these services (particularly 
justice) frequently entails singularly brutal methods, it has nonetheless won the support of 
many residents in these impoverished areas.238   
With their bases established in the backwaters of these two states, the Naxalites 
were able to begin branching out as they merged their operations and territories in the late 
1990s and early 2000s.  Exploiting similarly disadvantaged districts in neighboring states, 
they expanded their operations to Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra, Jharkhand, 
Chhattisgarh, and Orissa.  By 2006, they had also made small but significant inroads in 
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Uttar Pradesh, Kerala, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and West Bengal.239   Table 2 lists the 
number of incidents and deaths attributed to Naxalite activity from 2001 to 2006.  
Official figures for previous years are incomplete or nonexistent.   
However, an examination of what is available reveals that overall Naxalite 
activity was in decline from 1991 until about 1998, picked up again from 1998 through 
2003, and accelerated quickly from 2003 to the present. 
 
Table 2.   Total Naxalite Incidents (Figures in brackets indicate deaths). 
 
Statistics on the number of districts affected by Naxalism vary widely, with those 
of the Indian government tending to be on the low end. In 2006, the Ministry of Home 
Affairs reported only 76 districts affected in nine states.240  Some estimates from Jane’s 
Intelligence Review put the tally closer to 200.241  The most well respected and widely 
reported number comes from the Institute for Conflict Management, a New Delhi think 
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STATE 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Andhra Pradesh 461(180) 346(96) 575(139) 310(74) 532(206) 183(180) 138(90) 
Bihar 169(111) 239(117) 249(127) 323(171) 183(94) 107(51) 135(69) 
Chhattisgarh 105(37) 304(55) 254(74) 352(83) 380(165) 715(462) 582(435) 
Jharkhand 355(200) 353(157) 341(117) 379(169) 308(118) 310(144) 482(170) 
Maharashtra 34(7) 83(29) 74(31) 84(15) 95(53) 98(61) 94(30) 
Orissa 30(11) 68(11) 49(15) 50(46) 42(14) 44(23) 67(24) 
Other 54(18) 72(17) 48(10) 50(46) 54(19) 52(29) 67(17) 
Total 1208(564) 1465(482) 1590(513) 1533(566) 1594(669) 1509(950) 1565(835) 
Source:  GOI Ministry of Home Affairs Annual Reports   
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tank, that reports 192 districts in 16 states (out of a total of 602 districts in the country) 
were affected by various levels of Maoist mobilization and violence in early 2008.242  
Figure 1 is a map of the Naxal-affected districts from the Institute for Conflict 
Management.  As this graphic clearly shows, the ‘Red Corridor’ mooted at the first 
meeting of CCOMPOSA in 2001, and cavalierly dismissed as a pipedream by many in 
New Delhi, is indeed taking shape in the eastern half of India. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Map of Naxal-Affected Territory 
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Ajit K. Doval, the retired head of India’s Intelligence Bureau, recently predicted 
that if the Maoist threat were not effectively dealt with, it could spread to over 260 
districts by 2010, affecting over one-third of Indian territory.243  Other federal 
intelligence sources indicate that the Maoists have established operational bases and 
launched recruitment drives in New Delhi, Punjab, Haryana, and Gujarat.244  With these 
sobering assessments in mind, an examination of the Indian government’s response to the 
resurgent Naxalite threat is in order.       
D. GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
1. Center Responses 
Overall, India has been extremely reluctant to recognize the danger posed by the 
Maoist insurgency.  Throughout the 1990s, New Delhi habitually characterized the 
movement as a localized law and order problem that posed no direct danger to the state. 
To be fair, this was probably true while the insurgency remained confined to Andhra 
Pradesh and Bihar, but the inertia of this opinion prevented the acknowledgment of 
Naxalism’s growing strength as the unification process progressed through the early 
2000s.  This development caught the central government flatfooted, and its response to 
the insurgency has thus far been incoherent and inadequate. 
While the Prime Minister’s Office has issued numerous statements on the 
growing threat of Naxalite activity since 2004, the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), the 
department responsible for internal security, tends to downplay it.  Though Manmohan 
Singh identified Naxalism as India’s greatest internal security threat in April 2006, as 
recently as August 2007, the Union Home Minister was quoted as saying that “the Naxal 
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movement is little more than in the past.”245  Such contradictory assessments have 
doubtless undermined the urgency and efficacy of the government’s response. 
New Delhi has voiced its preference for a ‘two-pronged strategy,’ the details of 
which are enumerated in the MHA Annual Report for 2006-07.246  When closely 
scrutinized, however, most of the measures seem quite ad hoc.  On the security front, 
these include concrete steps like additional central funding for the modernization, 
training, and expansion of state police forces, the augmentation of state units with 
battalions of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), and the provision of specialized 
equipment, including armored personnel carriers and unmanned aerial reconnaissance 
vehicles.  Less tangibly, New Delhi has also established numerous committees, 
commissions, coordination centers, and joint task forces that bring together 
representatives from the Naxal-affected states, central government ministries, and 
security forces in an effort to enhance intelligence sharing and coordinate counter-
insurgent activities.  Ironically, there seems to be little coordination among these 
consultative groups themselves, often resulting in confusion and duplication of effort.247  
Indeed, many of the organizations cannot even agree on which states are affected by the 
insurgency, with the Task Force on Naxalism listing nine and the Standing Committee of 
Chief Ministers naming thirteen.   
On the development front, the Backward Districts Initiative (BDI) and Backward 
Regions Grant Fund (BRGF) were established to augment state government spending on 
infrastructure and development projects.  Additionally, through the Standing Committee 
of the Chief Ministers of the Naxal-Affected States, the states are urged to ensure 
implementation of existing legislation (like the Panchayat Extension to Scheduled Areas  
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(PESA) Act and the Forest Rights Bill) that guarantee the land rights of Scheduled Castes 
and Tribes.248  While other bodies also address development issues, none of these are 
anything but advisory in nature, with local governments retaining control of program 
implementation.  
The individual initiatives outlined above look nice on paper, but the lack of 
coordination among the various agencies prevents them from amounting to a coherent 
strategy as yet.  Potential steps in the right direction appeared in late 2006 with the 
establishment of the Naxal Management Division (within the MHA) and the Inter-
Ministerial Group (an inter-departmental panel chaired by the MHA).  The charters for 
these organizations notionally give them some power to oversee the coordination of the 
security and development efforts respectively, but it remains to be seen whether they will 
be able to impose order on the existing bureaucratic mess.  Even if they can, given the 
fact that India’s constitution places internal security and development matters firmly 
under the purview of the states, it is unlikely that these groups will be able to exercise 
much directive control of the anti-Naxal effort.  Much therefore depends on the efficacy 
of state efforts to address the insurgent problem.       
2. State Responses 
Unfortunately, the track records of most states in the anti-Maoist fight since 1991 
leave little room for optimism.  As indicated earlier, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar were the 
only two affected initially.  Bihar, persistently one of the poorest, least developed, and 
poorly governed states in India, was totally incapable of dealing with the MCC and PU 
cadres operating in its territory.249  It has a long history of bitter caste conflict, and the 
Naxalites were able to capitalize on the hostility of the marginalized Dalits and Adivasis 
to strengthen their positions through the 1990s. Attacks on upper caste landowners were 
common, and in the absence of a state response, the Ranvir Sena, an upper caste militia 
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founded in 1994, took matters into its own hands.  A combination of class and caste 
warfare followed, with rampant human rights abuses on both sides.250  At present, the 
conflict continues to simmer.  Bihar’s ineffective police force, with the lowest number of 
officers per capita in India, is unable to stop the violence.251  The corrupt state 
government has also failed to carry out land reforms or effective development projects, 
and funds from New Delhi are habitually misallocated or squandered.  Bihar, in short, is a 
mess. 
While Andhra Pradesh does not share Bihar’s legacy of totally inept governance, 
it too has had its political problems combating Naxalism.  Though still eschewing 
democracy, the PWG proved itself extremely adept at manipulating the state political 
process for its own purposes.  Throughout the 1990s, by pretending to consider the 
abjuration of violence, the Naxalites were able to intermittently secure a more lenient 
counter-insurgency effort, buying time to consolidate, regroup, and rearm.252  While this 
conciliation typically ended when the politicians realized the Maoists had no intention of 
actually giving up, successive administrations continued to make the same mistakes.   
When the PWG approached the government in 2002 and 2004 with offers of 
peace talks, Hyderabad (with urging from New Delhi) again took the bait, with 
predictable results.  Angered by the Naxalites’ betrayal, in 2005 the Chief Minister 
authorized a security crackdown that has returned surprisingly good results (see figures in 
Table 4.1).  Competent police work, an effective surrender policy, and firm political will 
have so far succeeded in driving the Maoists from all but 4 districts in the state.253  
Nevertheless, as many analysts have noted, Andhra Pradesh experienced success against 
the Naxalites in the past, only to have them return again with even greater virulence.254  
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Additionally, while the number of Maoists killed by the security forces has gone up since 
the most recent crackdown in 2005, most of the recent reduction in violence can likely be 
attributed to the temporary retreat of many of the insurgents across the border into 
neighboring Chhattisgarh.255  The recent discovery of a huge cache of weapons and 
explosives in Andhra Pradesh raises the specter of more violence to come. 
While the more recently affected states might do well to follow Andhra Pradesh’s 
example, unfortunately they seem to be going more the way of Bihar.  Despite their 
abundant mineral resources, states like Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, and Orissa are also some 
of the poorest in India, and the quality of governance, especially in the hinterlands, 
reflects this relatively shallow resource base.256 Though the extent of state breakdown is 
not as advanced as in Bihar, it is significant.  Corruption and administrative 
incompetence are both issues.   A combination of apathy and poor budgeting results in 
significant under-utilization of development grants from New Delhi, with millions of 
$U.S. sitting idle.257  As a result, state mandated development programs for the Adivasis, 
Dalits, and poor agricultural laborers are woefully under-funded, with many communities 
seeing little or no improvement.258  Given their manifest unwillingness or inability to 
deliver on the socio-economic front, it is little wonder that governments in these states 
tend to stress the law-and-order approach almost exclusively.259    
This too, however, has proven highly problematic.  In all of the most heavily 
Naxal-affected states, security forces are seriously undermanned for the size of the 
population, with many station houses sitting empty.260  As in Bihar, some states have 
turned to semi-official citizen’s militias to provide an inexpensive and local means of 
combating the Naxalites.  These groups include the NSS in Jharkhand and the Salwa 
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Judum in Chhattisgarh.261  However, with little or no oversight from authorities, many of 
these militias perpetrate human rights abuses rivaling those of the Naxalites.  Their habit 
of drawing forces from local populations also invites reprisals from the Maoists that can 
broaden the scope and lethality of the conflict.  According to the Asian Centre for Human 
Rights, the Salwa Judum campaign dramatically increased the number of civilians killed 
in the fighting in Chhattisgarh, displaced nearly 50,000 villagers to inadequately 
equipped refugee camps, and squeezed the Adivasis between equally vicious sides in 
what amounts to a low-intensity civil war.262  After two years of conflict and over 900 
killed, the Naxalites are still as powerful as ever in Chhattisgarh.  
Given the administrative weakness in most of the affected states, it is not 
surprising that efforts at coordinating anti-Naxal efforts among them have failed.  In spite 
of the best efforts of New Delhi to cajole them into cooperation, all the committees, 
commissions, and task forces have so far amounted to little more than talking shops.  
While modest improvements are being made in intelligence sharing, the state strategies 
remain, by and large, individual efforts.263  As long as the central government lacks the 
capacity to direct the effort more forcefully, the prospects for a comprehensive strategy 
appear dim. 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter examined the reemergence, growth, and spread of Naxalite activity 
since 1991.  It appears that Naxalism’s resurgence and increasing virulence in this period 
are the result of a confluence of factors.  The first of these, perhaps ironically, is a  
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consequence of India’s stunning economic growth.  For all its dynamism and macro-level 
successes, the country’s development remains extremely uneven.  The vast majority of 
the rural poor, particularly in the Adivasi and Dalit communities, have so far realized 
very little personal benefit from the economic reforms undertaken since 1991.  In fact, 
many have witnessed an actual deterioration of their circumstances, as the demand for 
raw material inputs to an expanding economy results in encroachment on what little land 
they actually possess.  Unsurprisingly, this results in a large measure of distrust in the 
fairness of the development strategy, and increasing hostility toward the government 
carrying it out.  As in the past, this situation provides fertile ground for the spread of an 
alternative ideology like Naxalism with its emphasis on the rights of the rural 
dispossessed. 
The second factor is the emergence of new, pragmatic, and effective leadership in 
the Naxalite movement.  The death or retirement of many of the old guard members, 
most of whom were jaded by decades of infighting, allowed new personalities like 
Ganapathy to work their way into senior positions.  Less encumbered by the legacy of 
ideological sclerosis, these senior members proved much more flexible, both 
philosophically and operationally.  Able to reconcile the differences of their forebears, 
they successfully engineered the reunification of a movement long crippled by 
factionalism, allowing it to finally reap organizational economies of scale.  Their 
pragmatism and adaptability also paid dividends on the strategic and tactical fronts, as the 
movement is now able to respond more effectively to challenges and opportunities in its 
operating environment than at any time in the past.  The impact of this leadership on the 
movement’s success would be difficult to overstate.     
Finally, the Maoists benefited from the singular inability of the state or central 
governments to mount a coordinated and effective counter to their expanding activity.  In 
this respect, both the federal nature of India’s governmental structure and the increasing 
factionalism within national and state politics are key factors.  While seemingly 
everybody now agrees that the Naxalites represent a threat to India’s continued growth, 
there is far less consensus on how large that threat is, let alone what specific measures 
should be taken to stop it.  The absence of a coherent and holistic national strategy 
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continues to leave the Maoists more than enough room for maneuver and expansion.  
With the ambition of shrewdness of their current leadership, it is little wonder they have 
continued to do just that. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
With a detailed historical examination of the various periods of Naxalite activity 
complete, this final chapter seeks to answer the central analytical question posed at the 
beginning of this thesis:  Does the Naxalite movement currently represent a qualitatively 
different and more dangerous threat to India than it has in the past?   
To address this fundamental question, the first section will compare the three 
periods of Naxalite activity in terms of their historical context, the internal characteristics 
of the insurgency, and the nature and efficacy of the governmental responses, informing a 
determination of the present movement’s relative strength, vitality, and danger.264  The 
second section will then examine the specific threats posed to India, with a focus on both 
current challenges and the most likely or dangerous future scenarios.  The third section 
turns to the implications of Naxalite resurgence for the United States’ regional foreign 
policy goals, and identifies any possible challenges to their attainment.  Finally, I will 
offer some cursory policy recommendations with the aim of checking Naxalism’s future 
spread and mitigating the dangers it already poses. 
A. A COMPARISON OF THE THREE PERIODS 
1. Historical Context 
As evident from the preceding case studies, India’s political, economic, and social 
milieu have always had a strong impact on Naxalite strength.  An unstable and 
deteriorating national situation contributed to the outbreak of violence in 1967 and the 
initial support for the movement over the five subsequent years.  Conversely, a generally 
more stable and improving situation in the country from 1972-1991 greatly diminished 
Naxalism’s appeal, helping to keep it at a low ebb for over two decades.  After 1991,  
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however, despite unprecedented GDP growth and national advancement on many fronts, 
a number of issues emerged that are strongly reminiscent of the first period of high 
Naxalite activity.  
The first of these are developments in the political sphere.  From 1967 to 1972, 
the political instability occasioned by infighting in the previously dominant Congress 
Party served to temporarily delegitimize the central government in New Delhi.  With the 
faith of the Indian public shaken, alternative political ideologies like Naxalism were able 
to take root and flourish among certain sectors of the electorate.  At the same time, the 
increasingly fractious nature of Indian politics, and the new requirements of coalition 
building, curtailed the government’s freedom of action and distracted it from emerging 
security challenges.   
After the elections of 1971, Indira Gandhi was able to orchestrate a new Congress 
hegemony (if sometimes in an authoritarian fashion) that brought political stability for 
almost two decades and enabled the government to more effectively counter the Naxalite 
threat. In the 1990s, however, Congress Party dominance came to a definitive end with 
the emergence of the BJP, Janata Dal, and a host of regional and state level parties as 
effective challengers.  Since then, increased structural fragmentation and instability have 
paralleled the conditions prevailing in the late 1960s.  As a result, the same restrictions, 
distractions, and crises of public confidence that existed in the Organizational Period 
have returned, only now in a much stronger and arguably more permanent form. 
Some aspects of the current economic situation also bear a closer similarity to the 
first period of Naxalite activity than the second.  The mid to late-1960s witnessed 
economic stagnation throughout the country, but the landless laborers, sharecroppers, 
small farmers, and tribals that made up the rural poor felt the pain most acutely.  The 
Green Revolution was in its infancy, and while it eventually brought tremendous benefit 
to the Indian countryside, its initial implementation further disadvantaged the already 
marginalized groups listed above - many small farmers lost what little land they 
possessed, and rural inequality increased substantially.  By contrast, a more populist 
economic agenda after 1972 introduced a series of land reform and development 
initiatives at the national and state levels that significantly improved the lot of the rural 
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poor, even if they did little for the overall economy.  As a result, inequality and poverty 
declined through the 1970s and 80s, particularly in the countryside. 
The liberalization that began in the 1990s certainly brought greater 
macroeconomic success, but with benefits conspicuously skewed toward the higher end 
of the socio-economic scale.  Although overall poverty rates continue to drop, disparities 
between rich and poor (and especially urban and rural) reemerged as sources of economic 
frustration.  Increased industrialization, SEZ development, and resource extraction also 
reintroduced land issues as a potent source of disaffection.  In sum, while India’s recent 
market reform and development initiatives ushered in levels of growth unprecedented in 
the nation’s history, they also occasioned economic dislocations that were all too familiar 
in the late 1960s.  Moreover, with New Delhi’s commitment to these reforms tempered 
by a desire for gradualism, the current economic complications could persist far longer 
than those occasioned by the Green Revolution.  
Unsurprisingly, these dislocations have resulted in a number of social 
developments that are also reminiscent of the Organizational Period.  Then, the anger and 
desperation of the rural poor manifested themselves in demonstrations, strikes, and food 
riots; stories of farmers driven to suicide by their dire economic straits further highlighted 
the growing dissatisfaction in the countryside.  Social strife was prevalent in the 1970s 
and 80s, too, but usually organized along separatist, nationalist, or communalist lines.  
While these other triggers of unrest persist in the modern era, it is clear that economic 
issues have returned as a potent force for social mobilization.   
Food riots may be a thing of the past, but rural protests and demonstrations, like 
those at Nandigram in 2007, are becoming increasingly common.265  In another 
disturbing parallel, suicides by indebted small farmers have also spiked in recent 
years.266  The growing anger and alienation is felt most strongly in India’s rural Dalit and 
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Adivasi communities.  In many ways, these two groups are the most left behind by 
India’s inequitable climb to modernity, and are proving to be uniquely amenable to the 
Naxalites’ populist rhetoric. 
The purpose of this analysis is not to suggest that India’s current political, 
economic, and social situations are identical to those that prevailed in the late 1960s; 
clearly there are numerous differences, many of them significant.  Nevertheless, in 
comparing the historical contexts of the three relevant periods, it seems obvious that the 
current era of Naxalite activity bears many striking similarities to the movement’s 
previous high point.  In addition, while many of the conditions that gave rise to the initial 
Naxalite movement were transitory in nature, they are likely to prove more enduring in 
the current context.  It is also evident that many of the factors that helped keep Naxalism 
in check from 1972-1991 are no longer present in modern-day India. While these facts do 
not necessarily imply the inevitability of a resurgent Maoist threat, they do suggest that 
the current situation in India provides a potentially fertile breeding ground for the 
movement’s expansion.  
2. Characteristics of the Naxalite Insurgency 
In contrast to the discussion above, when comparing the internal characteristics of 
the current insurgency with those of previous periods, one searches in vain for any strong 
parallels.  Though a cursory analysis might find a basic similarity between the 
Organizational and Reconsolidation Periods, in that they were both eras of relatively high 
violent activity, a more careful study reveals this impression to be misleading.  With the 
exception of its most basic aims, the current iteration of the Naxalite insurgency 
demonstrates fundamental and striking differences with any of those that came before. 
In terms of organization and leadership, the movement from 1967 to 1972 initially 
gave an impression of vitality.  Charu Mazumdar’s authority appeared unquestioned, and 
the formation of the CPI-(ML) in 1969 seemed to unite most of the Maoist 
revolutionaries under one powerful organization.  In reality, however, Mazumdar’s 
supremacy proved short-lived, and numerous challengers to his leadership appeared 
within a few years.  Even when he had control, Mazumdar ultimately proved to be 
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relatively incompetent, as evidenced by his total misreading of the potential for 
revolutionary agitation and his ultimately self-defeating organizational, strategic, and 
tactical formulations.  The CPI-(ML) was similarly weak and ineffectual, functioning 
more as a symbol than a unifying or guiding force.  After 1972, the Naxalites were even 
more hampered by inept and divided leadership, which fragmented the movement and 
rendered it impotent for two long decades.   
Since 1991, however, a new generation of able and pragmatic leaders, Ganapathy 
foremost among them, have found a way to reconcile ideological differences that 
previously splintered the insurgency.  Under their guidance, the largest of the formerly 
competing groups united under the banner of the CPI-Maoist, an institution far stronger 
and more effective than its predecessor.  With the benefit of firm central guidance 
exercised through subsidiary organizations like the PLGA and the PDFI, the Naxalites 
are able to coordinate their activities to an extent unheard of in the movement’s long 
history. 
The impact of this new leadership and organizational structure is particularly 
evident in the revolution that has occurred in Naxalite strategy and tactics.  During the 
Organizational Period, Mazumdar’s belief that the situation was ripe for a rapid, 
spontaneous, and nationwide rebellion resulted in the employment of a sadistic 
‘annihilation program’ to arouse the revolutionary zeal of the masses.  His myopia led to 
the willful neglect of any mass organization along economic or social lines, which, as it 
turned out, were far more likely to garner the support of the rural poor than exclusively 
political ambitions.  As a result, while the Naxalites were able to win the initial support of 
certain segments of the countryside, this usually proved fleeting.  Tactically, the Maoists 
favored unsophisticated small-unit operations with primitive local weapons, leaving their 
cadres woefully outmanned and outgunned against police and security forces. 
The failure of these approaches contributed to the fragmentation from 1972-1991, 
and resulted in severe strategic dissonance among the various smaller groups that 
dominated the movement during this period.  While some continued to espouse a strictly 
violent line and were quickly crushed, a sizeable number of others opted for political 
normalization.  A third group, while remaining committed to armed revolution, gradually 
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began to expand their activities beyond purely political violence.  It was not until after 
1991, however, that this last approach truly came to fruition. 
During the Reconsolidation Period, the most successful Naxalite groups adopted a 
two-pronged strategy that married overtly political violence with greater mass 
organization and agitation along socio-economic lines, a shift that precipitated a number 
of operational changes.  With respect to their violent activities, the Maoists still liquidate 
the usual ‘class enemies,’ but increasingly focus their attention on economic and 
infrastructure targets, as well.  Railroads, telephone exchanges, mines, and industrial 
plants have been attacked recently, in addition to the more typical litany of jails, police 
stations, jotedars, and politicians.  The tactical acumen demonstrated in these operations 
is usually quite impressive, and frequently entails coordinated attacks by hundreds, if not 
thousands, of well-armed cadres.  The extent and sophistication of these recent actions is 
unprecedented and marks a major break from the largely ineffectual efforts of the past.     
More aboveground activity is also evident, with well-coordinated strikes and 
demonstrations against SEZs and locally unpopular development initiatives added to the  
Naxalite arsenal.  In the more remote areas of their activity, they have also stepped up 
social efforts at the village level to provide judicial, administrative, and other 
governmental functions so sorely lacking in many of India’s poorer states.  Such 
initiatives win support from the rural Dalit and Adivasi communities, and help assuage 
resentment towards their more violent activities that undermined the Maoists in previous 
periods.  By most accounts, the movement currently enjoys more sympathizers and 
activists than it ever did in the past.   
Partially as a result of this expanding support base, the extent of Naxalite activity 
is also greater than it has been at any time in its history.  For all its grandiose aims of 
national revolution, the total area affected by Maoist violence was relatively modest in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s.  Individual flare-ups were reported from many Indian 
states, but the bulk of activity was confined to West Bengal, Bihar, Andhra Pradesh, and 
a few contiguous territories in adjacent states.  With the movement’s decline in the 
following two decades, the areas touched by violent activity shrank to a few isolated 
pockets of its former strongholds. 
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By contrast, during the Reconsolidation Period, and particularly since 2001, the 
Naxalite phenomenon has spread virulently.  In large part, this was a direct result of the 
leadership’s more pragmatic vision.  Finally rejecting Mazumdar’s naïve belief that the 
revolution could be achieved quickly, the CPI-Maoist embraced the notion of a protracted 
struggle.  To achieve victory, they set the goal of slowly and deliberately growing their 
areas of operation in the countryside with the ultimate aim of encircling the government’s 
strongholds in the major cities.  In the first part of this plan, at least, they have enjoyed 
remarkable success.  Estimates by Indian security analysts suggest the movement 
currently affects over 182 districts in 16 states.267 Most of these areas are in the eastern 
half of India, giving rise to what is dubbed the ‘Red Corridor,’ running from Nepal to the 
southern half of Andhra Pradesh. 
In another recent development, the Naxalites broadened their expansionist aims 
by forging new cross-border linkages with Maoist groups in neighboring countries.  
These were inaugurated in 2001 with the formation of CCOMPOSA, which networked 
movements in several South Asian nations.  While most of these contacts remain 
relatively tenuous, those between the CPI-Maoist and their Nepalese counterparts, the 
CPN, grew quite strong over the first half of this decade.  Besides other revolutionary 
communist parties, the Naxalites also reached out to other regional insurgent movements, 
most notably the LTTE in Sri Lanka.  This web of contacts brought numerous logistical 
and tactical advantages, and is another reason for the movement’s current success. 
From this analysis, it seems obvious that the Naxalite insurgency itself is much 
stronger and more widespread today than it was in any previous period.  While its 
ideology and ambition remain roughly the same, new leadership has reorganized and 
reinvigorated the movement, and brought about highly effective changes in strategy and 
tactics.  As a result, both its base of support and geographical area of influence have 
increased substantially, finally drawing the attention of the Indian government.                         
                                                 
267 Ajai Sahni, “Maoists: Creeping Malignancy,” South Asia Terrorism Portal, July 2, 2007, 
http://satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/5_51.htm, (accessed September 13, 2007). 
 90
3. Efficacy of the Governmental Response 
The state’s ability to counter the Naxalite threat has varied quite a bit over the 
past four decades. These fluctuations were largely determined by India’s broader political 
context, specifically the central and state governments’ freedom of action and relative 
levels of policy coordination.  Given the proliferation of new parties and the evolution of 
political dynamics in recent decades (discussed earlier in this chapter), it should come as 
no surprise that dealing with Naxalism is more complicated now than in the past. 
New Delhi’s initial response to the insurgency in the Organizational Period was 
generally weak, distracted as it was by the temporary instability at the center from 1967 
until 1971.  As it reconsolidated its authority, however, the Congress-led government’s 
response became much more effective.  The imposition of President’s Rule in West 
Bengal and the provision of security for upcoming elections gave it the freedom to pursue 
the Naxalites aggressively, which it did with devastating efficiency and sometimes 
heavy-handed tactics.  With the stick of the security forces augmented the carrot of 
cursory development and land reforms, the initial outbreak of Naxal violence was 
quashed in little more than a year.  The INC retained its firm grip on political power at 
the center over the subsequent two decades, and while Naxalism was not much of a threat 
during this period, New Delhi dealt with it effectively when the occasional flare-ups 
occurred.  Rural economic and development initiatives undercut the Maoists’ support, 
and what remained of the movement was all but destroyed by government security 
actions, especially during the Emergency.  
Since the 1990s, however, structural shifts in Indian politics have handicapped the 
center’s efforts in dealing with Naxalism. The persistent weakness and fragility of India’s 
coalition governments constrained state action in addressing domestic security concerns, 
a situation compounded by New Delhi’s initial reluctance to acknowledge the growing 
problem of Naxalite violence.  Even today, significant confusion exists among the 
relevant government agencies as to which areas are actually affected and the level of 
coordination among these organizations remains remarkably low.  This results in 
 91
generally incoherent anti-Naxal policymaking and has prevented the development of a 
concerted national strategy to address the insurgency. 
Changes in the center-state relationship also influenced the ability of local 
governments to confront the Maoists’ activity.  Since 1947, responsibility for matters of 
internal security has been constitutionally devolved to the individual states.  In the 1960s 
and 1970s, Congress’ hegemony at the center extended to the governments of most 
Naxal-affected states, resulting in generally well-coordinated efforts against the Maoist 
threat.  Central Reserve Police and military forces augmented local efforts to put down 
the first phase of the insurgency, and the state administrations generally toed the line in 
implementing many of the rural aid and reform packages dictated by the federal 
government during the Emergency.   
As the INC began to lose its grip at the state level after 1977, center-state 
cooperation against the Naxalites started to falter.  Given the greatly diminished force of 
the insurgency through most of the 1980s, however, this scarcely mattered.  The non-
Congress administrations that emerged in West Bengal and Andhra Pradesh proved quite 
successful going it alone.  A competent Communist government in West Bengal initiated 
aggressive land reforms and development legislation that effectively removed the Maoist 
threat in a few short years, and the TDP pursued a combination of security and economic 
initiatives that constrained Naxalite activity in Andhra Pradesh to a few isolated pockets.  
In light of the resurgent Maoist threat over the following decades, however, the ability of 
states to independently counter the insurgency is increasingly suspect.  
The proliferation of regional and state-level political parties after 1991 further 
strained center-state relations. The states have so far proven incapable of coordinating 
their current anti-Naxal efforts with any administration in New Delhi.  Inter-state 
cooperation remains similarly elusive.  Though political competition is an important part 
of this problem, another contributing factor is the poor level of governance in many of the 
Naxal-affected areas, as incompetent leadership sabotages efforts to synchronize policies 
across state lines. 
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This persistent maladministration (particularly in Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, 
and Orissa) severely undermines these states’ ability to fight the insurgency in other 
ways, as well.  A dearth of effective local government leaves an administrative vacuum 
the Naxalites are able to exploit, while rampant corruption and the misallocation of 
resources contribute to popular unrest in the countryside.  With development initiatives 
failing and their police forces underfunded, many of these states are turning to poorly 
supervised vigilante groups to counter the Maoists, usually only exacerbating an already 
volatile situation.  While Andhra Pradesh and West Bengal continue to enjoy success in 
their fight against the Naxalites, the less than salutary efforts by most of the other 
affected states leave little hope that the current insurgency can be checked by their efforts 
alone. 
In most respects, it thus appears that India is presently confronted with more 
internal challenges to countering the Naxalite threat than it experienced in any of the 
previous periods.  Administrative confusion and inertia at the national level, persistent 
corruption and governance problems at the state level, and systemic political changes at 
all levels are conspiring to constrain the state’s freedom of action and prevent it from 
confronting the Maoists as aggressively as it did in the past.  
4. Summary 
In summary, the current iteration of Naxalism does represent a qualitatively 
different threat to India than those that came before.  While the, political, economic and 
social contexts in which it presently operates are in many ways reminiscent of those 
prevailing during the other high period of Naxalite activity, nearly everything about the 
movement itself has changed. An infusion of new leadership in the early 1990s brought 
about the unification of previously disparate and antagonistic groups under the banner of 
one overarching organization, the CPI-Maoist, allowing for greater centralized control 
and coordination of effort.  It also occasioned a revolution in strategy and tactics that has 
made the movement more operationally effective now than it ever was in the past. 
By contrast, the government’s ability to counter the insurgency is more 
circumscribed today than in previous periods.  Systemic changes in the political structure 
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that manifested themselves after 1991 have resulted in generally weaker governments in 
New Delhi and far less cooperation between the states and the center.  Additionally, 
corruption and poor governance currently hamper counterinsurgency efforts in many of 
the most heavily affected states.  As a result, India’s most recent anti-Naxal policies have 
thus far been anemic, disjointed, and incoherent when compared with those of the 
preceding decades. 
With this combination of a reinvigorated insurgency and a relatively impotent 
governmental response, it seems clear that the Naxalite movement poses a greater danger 
to India today than it has at any point in the 40 years of its existence.  The precise nature 
of this threat is the subject of the next section.           
B. THE CURRENT THREAT TO INDIA 
With an analysis of the Naxalite movement’s vitality complete, this section 
examines the specific challenges posed by the insurgency.  Concern has certainly been 
growing among most observers in India, and many now agree with its characterization as 
the country’s greatest internal threat.  While the purpose here is not to assess the accuracy 
of Prime Minister Singh’s famous assertion, a thorough and objective evaluation of the 
movement’s dangers is a necessary precursor to the formulation of effective policies to 
counter them. 
1. Political Dangers 
In spite of the grandiose aims Maoists’ grandiose aims, and the hyperbole 
generated by some in New Delhi’s security establishment, the Naxalites probably do not 
pose a long-term political threat to the viability of the Indian state.  After 60 years, liberal 
parliamentary democracy is too deeply entrenched in the national psyche and too firmly 
institutionalized within the political culture for an obviously authoritarian ideology to 
supplant it.  Indeed, even during the late 1960s, arguably the heyday of international 
revolutionary communism, Naxalism’s political agenda failed to gain any lasting traction 
in the Indian context.  Over the subsequent decades, as communism retreated from the  
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world stage and India embraced free-market capitalism with remarkable, if uneven, 
success, Maoism’s general appeal as an alternative economic and political system can 
only have receded.   
While it is true the movement probably enjoys more membership now than it did 
previously, it is also the case that the majority of these activists, drawn from the 
impoverished rural Adivasi and Dalit communities, are still motivated more by local 
socio-economic goals than explicit political rhetoric.  As in the past, they would be 
extremely difficult to mobilize further once their personal grievances were addressed.  
Moreover, while the Naxalites’ daring attacks certainly grab headlines, it should be 
remembered that even if the largest numerical estimates of their activists and supporters 
are utilized, they still account for less than 1/100th of 1% of India’s estimated 1.2 billion 
population.  For all these reasons, it is highly unlikely the Naxalites will be able to 
instigate a widespread political revolution even in the states where they are strongest, let 
alone garner enough strength to allow them to seize political power from New Delhi.        
Nevertheless, the Naxalites do pose a serious threat to security and stability at the 
local and regional levels. This is already a problem in the remote areas where they are 
currently active.  In states like Bihar, Chhattisgarh, and Jharkhand, where the 
government’s writ is already questionable, their activities undercut what little legitimacy 
the legal authorities still possess.  This not only contributes to the breakdown of law and 
order, but also hinders the delivery of governmental and administrative services that most 
of these areas so desperately need.   
The threat to internal stability posed by the insurgency could be significantly 
higher, however, were it to spread beyond its present confines in the rural parts of eastern 
India.  One particularly dangerous development would be the movement’s migration 
from the countryside to the nation’s cities.  While these have been the greatest 
beneficiaries of recent growth, they also contain some of the world’s largest 
concentrations of urban poverty, with India’s slum population doubling in the last 20 
years alone.268  Though Naxalite ideology has historically struggled to find an audience 
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in India’s metropolitan areas (as its early failure in Calcutta would attest) there are 
indications the CPI-Maoist may be willing to try again.  The Naxalite document “Urban 
Perspective” details their strategy for expanding the revolution by mobilizing disaffected 
segments of the urban community, and an interview with Ganapathy in 2007 quoted him 
stressing “the need to go deeply into other sections of the urban areas – the working class, 
students, youth, middle class, small traders, hawkers, and so on.”269  The Maoists’ ability 
to translate their rural appeal to these new groups may be suspect, but any agitation in 
India’s teeming cities could be severely disruptive.           
A more plausible, and potentially even more dangerous, destination for Naxalite 
expansion would be to rural areas already harboring other insurgent movements.  Were 
these groups to make common cause with the Maoists, even if only on a logistical or 
tactical level, the resulting quantum of violence could be high enough to threaten the 
integrity of parts of Indian territory.  While such potentially synergistic movements do 
not, by and large, exist in the ’Red Corridor’ they can be found in abundance in India’s 
turbulent Northeast.  While many security analysts point to the threat of Naxalism’s 
expansion to the south and west, little attention has thus far been paid to the implications 
of its spread to this already volatile area.   
More than any other region, the political, economic, and social conditions in the 
states comprising India’s ‘Seven Sisters’ bear a striking resemblance to those prevailing 
in areas already afflicted by Naxal violence.  The plethora of insurgencies active in the 
Northeast have already challenged New Delhi’s authority for decades and accounted for 
more than 50,000 deaths.  They also bear more than superficial similarities to the 
Naxalite movement:  nearly all are fueled by the same potent mixture of 
underdevelopment, poverty, social strife, and political disenfranchisement that sustained 
Indian Maoism for over four decades; disaffected tribal populations make up the bulk of 
the insurgents; and while all of these uprisings have strong ethnic components, many of 
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the largest and most violent, including those in Assam, Nagaland, Manipur, and Tripura, 
are also explicitly leftist in their ideology.270  
In the past, this was enough to justify some tentative logistical links between 
Naxalite groups and separatist organizations like the ULFA.  Now, however, with the 
Maoists looking to broaden their area of operations, more significant overtures have been 
forthcoming.  The Political Resolution of the Third Conference of CCOMPOSA in 2004 
and the Ninth Party Congress of the CPI-Maoist in 2007 both expressed support for the 
nationalist struggles in the Northeast, and called for all revolutionary organizations to 
work together in their fight against “feudalism and imperialism.”271  Were this 
cooperation to actually come about, the challenge to India’s internal security would be 
much greater. 
2. Economic Dangers 
While some of the aforementioned dangers are admittedly only future 
possibilities, the resurgence of Naxalism already poses a number of significant threats to 
India in the present.  The most serious of these is arguably on the economic front.  
Though the areas currently affected by the insurgency directly account for only a small 
percentage of India’s total GDP, they contain a disproportionate share of many natural 
resources that are vital to its continued growth and development.  The country’s energy 
supply, overwhelmingly reliant on coal-fired power plants, is particularly threatened.  
Over 85% of India’s coal deposits are located in heavily Naxal-affected states, and the 
Maoists have repeatedly targeted mines and distribution centers in their attacks on 
economic targets.  With the country already facing crippling shortfalls in electricity 
production, these actions are proving increasingly disruptive.  Efforts to develop 
hydroelectric alternatives are similarly hampered by Maoist attacks on dams and 
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electrical supply lines.272  As a report for the Institute for the Analysis of Global Security 
noted, “Naxalism puts almost half of India’s total energy supply at serious political 
risk.”273  
Nor is it only energy resources that are threatened.  Bihar, Jharkhand, and Orissa 
contain the bulk of India’s iron ore and Andhra Pradesh has large reserves of bauxite, key 
inputs in any industrialization effort.  The January 2007 report of the CPI-Maoist’s 
Central Military Commission explicitly identified a number of industrial plants and 
resource development initiatives in these states as potential targets.274  In light of several 
recent attacks on steel mills and other industrial complexes, many corporations are taking 
threats like this seriously and shying away from the most unstable areas.275  As a result, 
India loses access to badly needed raw materials, and outside investment is denied to 
those parts of the country that need it most. 
With its famously inadequate infrastructure, India is also vulnerable to another of 
the Naxalites’ recent tactical innovations, the coordinated economic blockade.  The 
transshipment of goods between states is already grossly inefficient, and anything that 
further complicates this process can produce significant economic disruption.  One such 
blockade, carried out over two days in June 2007, targeted railroad, highway, and 
communication infrastructure across six states and resulted in over $U.S. 30 million of 
lost revenue.276  The knock-on effects of these actions are also quite significant.  As the 
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increased costs are passed along to consumers nationwide, they contribute to an inflation 
rate that has recently hovered around a troublingly high 7%.277   
If all that were not enough, Naxalite activity directly threatens India’s broader 
economy in one other way.   Besides access to raw materials and energy resources, the 
country’s further growth and development are contingent upon greater market 
liberalization and inflows of foreign capital.  The Maoists’ violent opposition to SEZ 
development, dramatically announced in their call to “turn every SEZ into a battlefield,” 
has helped to stall an initiative that promised to circumvent many of the repressive 
regulatory holdovers from the ‘License Raj’ and bring in badly needed foreign 
investment.  If the plan is not put back on track, India will forgo an estimated $U.S. 13.5 
billion in FDI and over 890,000 new jobs over the next two years alone.278    
3. Social Dangers 
While the monetary ramifications of the insurgency are sobering, Naxalism’s 
costs are not confined to India’s economy.  On the social front, the movement’s 
resurgence brought more tangible, and bloodier, consequences.  Of the more than 20,000 
deaths attributable to Naxalite violence over the four decades of the insurgency’s 
existence, a disproportionately high number have occurred during the Reconsolidation 
Period.279  The vast majority of these were innocent civilians, collateral damage in the 
ongoing battle between Maoist and security forces.  The fighting has also created tens of 
thousands of refugees, mostly in those states least able to provide assistance; predictably, 
most of those affected belong to the rural Adivasi and Dalit communities.  As a result of 
these humanitarian crises, India’s already strained social fabric is in danger of unraveling 
in many parts of the countryside, seriously complicating the task of rural development.  
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Nowhere is this more evident than in Bihar and Chhattisgarh, where the culture of 
violence has virtually paralyzed the government, economy, and society in most parts of 
the states. 
4. External Dangers 
Compounding all these dangers are recent developments in Nepal.  In 1996, 
Nepal’s own Maoist organization, the CPN, launched a violent insurgency of its own 
against the government in Kathmandu.  In 2006, following ten years of bloody fighting 
that claimed over 13,000 lives, an alliance between the CPN and seven mainstream 
political parties forced King Gyanendra to hand over power to an interim government 
charged with drafting a new constitution for the troubled country.  The Maoists control 
one of the largest voting blocs in this new government, and are reckoned by many 
observers to comprise “the most organized political force in the country.”280  Still heavily 
armed, they have also threatened a return to violence if their political aims are not met.281  
The CPN enjoyed an overwhelming victory in the constituent assembly elections of April 
2008, and it seems inevitable they will emerge as the most powerful force in Nepal’s new 
government.282 
The consequences for India’s fight against the Naxalites are potentially dire.  On 
the one hand, New Delhi helped broker the deal that brought the CPN into the political 
mainstream, and the Maoists’ second in command, Baburam Bhattarai, recently stated 
that his organization would do nothing to threaten his country’s relationship with 
India.283  On the other hand, judging by its rhetoric and recent activities, the CPN 
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remains committed to the goal of spreading Maoism throughout South Asia, by force if 
necessary.  As recently as September 2005, Prachanda (the leader of the CPN) and 
Ganapathy released a joint statement pledging to “fight unitedly until the entire 
conspiracies hatched by the imperialists and reactionaries are crushed and the people’s 
cause of socialism and communism are established in Nepal, India, and all over the 
world.”284  And in late 2006, after they had agreed to join the Nepalese parliament, the 
CPN adopted a joint resolution with the other members of CCOMPOSA that declared 
South Asia should “turn into a flaming field of people’s revolutionary upsurges and burn 
to ashes imperialism (particularly U.S. imperialism), Indian expansionism and all 
reactionaries in the region.”   It went on to state that it had “decided to enhance 
coordination and cooperation among the Maoist forces in its various fields of activity.”285   
Given its devout ideological commitment and the long history of cooperation with 
the Naxalites, these latter statements are probably a better indication of the CPN’s 
intentions with respect to their Maoist brethren to the south than any platitudes about 
noninterference in India’s internal affairs.  Though they may be more carefully concealed 
in the future, the ties between the CPN and CPI-Maoist will almost certainly remain 
strong.  Nepal will continue to provide a haven for Naxalite cadres, and with the greater 
resources of the government in Kathmandu at their disposal, the materiel and manpower 
support from the CPN will probably increase.  These developments will obviously 
strengthen the Naxalites’ position and make New Delhi’s efforts to counter them that 
much more complicated.     
5. Summary 
In the final analysis, the resurgence of Naxalism probably does not pose a long-
term danger to the viability of the Indian state. History has proven the Maoist ideology to 
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be demonstrably bankrupt, and this fact is not lost on the overwhelming majority of the 
Indian populace.  While the movement has recently grown in geographical breadth, it has 
not commensurately increased the depth of its appeal.  Outside a small core of committed 
ideologues, most of the movement’s sympathizers are motivated by local socio-economic 
grievances and remain unmoved by its calls for political revolution.  Given time, 
provided India’s economic development can be kept on track and the resulting benefits 
spread more broadly, the country will likely grow itself out of the Naxalite phenomenon. 
In the short to medium term, however, the Naxalites do represent a significant 
threat to India on a number of fronts.  Even if they ultimately prove too weak to challenge 
the authority of New Delhi, the Maoists can generate substantial political instability at a 
local and regional level, particularly in those states where governance is already an issue.  
This situation would only be exacerbated by a linkup with other insurgent groups, a very 
real threat in certain regions of India.  Economically, too, the Naxalites can be far more 
disruptive than their numbers alone would suggest.  The areas in which they are strongest 
are vital to the country’s economic expansion, and their activities have already proven 
extremely disruptive.  The violence attendant to the insurgency carries significant social 
costs as well, and the resulting insecurity and breakdown in civil society hold back 
development in some of the poorest corners of India. 
What is more, given the intractability of many of the movement’s contributing 
causes, its potential for spread, the efficacy of its new strategy and tactics, and the 
difficulties faced by the state in mounting an effective challenge, the Naxalite problem 
will probably get worse before it gets better.  Clearly, then, the Maoists do pose a danger 
to India’s continued growth and stability, and deserve their characterization by New 
Delhi as a serious threat to internal security.  With a country so important to the 
international system, however, and in an increasingly globalized world, the implications 
of this determination extend far beyond India’s shores.  The next section will examine the 
impact of these conclusions on United States interests in South Asia.  
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C. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES 
While Naxalism is obviously not as serious a threat to the United States as it is to 
its home country, it still poses a challenge to American interests in South Asia.  It would 
be difficult to overstate the importance of a strong, stable, and prosperous India to United 
States foreign policy goals in the region.  As the world’s largest democracy, it provides a 
powerful example of the benefits of political freedom to neighboring countries, many of 
which are still burdened with authoritarian governments.  At the same time, its economic 
success is an increasingly vital contributor to world economic growth, and its rapidly 
expanding market provides a destination for American exports and investment.  
Strategically, the country’s growing military and diplomatic clout provide useful 
counterweights to China’s rising influence, particularly in the Indian Ocean.  Its 
commanding presence on this body of water also uniquely positions it to contribute to the 
security of world energy supplies, particularly those leaving the Persian Gulf.  Finally, 
India’s own experience with Islamist violence and proximity to many of the most 
troubled parts of the Muslim world make it a key ally in the Global War on Terror.   
It is little wonder, then, that the United States has been assiduously cultivating a 
strategic partnership with New Delhi in recent years, even vowing to “help India become 
a major world power in the 21st century.”286  This burgeoning relationship is 
multifaceted, but generally hinges around cooperation in three key areas: security, 
economic, and energy.287  While the energy aspect has received the most attention lately 
(in the form of debate over the Civil Nuclear Cooperation agreement), advances on the 
economic and security fronts are far more significant.  After years of strained economic 
relations, the United States is now India’s single largest trading partner and the source of 
most its inbound FDI.288  Military and security cooperation have also expanded greatly, 
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especially since the “New Framework for the U.S.-India Defense Relationship” was 
signed in 2005.289  While this partnership is notionally based on shared political values 
and ideals, it is also firmly grounded in the growing compatibility of the two countries’ 
foreign policy goals, and promises significant benefits to each.  If India is to live up to its 
potential as a strategic partner, however, it will need to ensure its own internal stability 
and the continuation of its economic growth and development. 
Naxalism threatens India’s ability to become the sort of partner the United States 
desires in a number of ways.  The instability generated by the insurgency tarnishes 
India’s reputation as a successful, functioning democracy in a region that badly needs 
such a model.  It also necessitates a shift of its security focus inwardly, occupying 
millions of dollars in defense resources and diminishing the country’s ability to respond 
to external threats like an expansionist China or international terrorism.290  The threat to 
India’s domestic energy supply also makes cooperation on other issues more difficult.  
Because of the greater insecurity, policymakers in New Delhi are more likely to pursue 
unilateral efforts to procure their own foreign sources, efforts that may not be in line with 
American strategic objectives.  This behavior can already be seen in India’s relationship 
with Iran, where New Delhi’s eagerness to secure oil and natural gas has put it at odds 
with United States policies towards Tehran.291  The insurgency also carries economic 
costs for the United States – by jeopardizing India’s continued growth and appetite for 
liberalizing reform, it helps restrict access to an enormously important market. 
As United States economic and security cooperation with India deepen, the 
Naxalites may come to pose a more direct threat to the nation’s interests, as well.  Maoist 
literature is already replete with diatribes against what it calls “US imperialism,” going so 
far as to call it “the number one enemy of the world’s people.”292  Large multi-national 
corporations, Western capitalism, and the Global War on Terror are all seen as part of an 
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American conspiracy toward global domination and singled out for particular invective.  
The CPI-Maoist goes so far as to call the Islamist insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan 
“heroic armed resistance,” vowing that it “lends full support to these anti-imperialist 
movements.”293  The group put force behind this anti-American rhetoric in 2003 when it 
attacked a PepsiCo warehouse in Andhra Pradesh, apparently  in retaliation for the United 
States invasion of Iraq.294 
While a report in the Christian Science Monitor quoted Naxalite commanders 
offering aid and refuge to al Qaeda operatives, no evidence yet exists for concrete ties 
between the movement and Islamist terrorism.295  Indeed, given Islamic aversion to an 
atheist ideology like Maoism, such a link-up is difficult to fathom.  Nevertheless, the 
Maoists’ statements and actions leave little doubt of the enmity they harbor toward the 
United States.  As American investment in India grows, other corporations may, like 
Pepsi, become symbolically charged outlets for this hatred.  Should United States military 
assets or personnel ever come to be based in India (a distinct possibility given the two 
nation’s growing security cooperation) they would be similarly tempting targets.   
Therefore, while Naxalism remains primarily an Indian problem, its recent 
resurgence does have ramifications for the United States.  The movement already poses a 
number of indirect threats to American foreign policy goals in the region, and as time 
wears on, it may represent a more direct danger to its economic and security interests 
within India.  Clearly, then, the United States has a stake in seeing the Maoist insurgency 
defeated, and in assisting its new strategic partner in bringing this about as expeditiously 
as possible.  
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D. FINAL THOUGHTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The True Nature of the Problem 
At its heart, the current Naxalite problem is primarily a socio-economic one.  The 
core of the movement is composed of committed political ideologues, but the vast 
majority of its supporters and activists are simply poor members of the rural community, 
primarily Adivasis and Dalits, who have turned to it out of frustration at being left behind 
by India’s uneven growth.  While the former will probably never be persuaded they have 
a place in a modern, democratic, and capitalist India, the latter would likely prove quite 
easy to convince, provided the benefits of development could reach them sufficiently.  
Given India’s systemic corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency, and the cumbersome nature 
of its federal structure, this is admittedly a tall order.  Nevertheless, some progress is 
being made, as the persistently declining poverty rates of the last several years attest.   
Unfortunately, several factors external to governmental competence are 
conspiring to keep the pace of development sufficiently slow to allow the Maoists’ appeal 
to spread ever farther throughout rural India.  One is the magnitude of the challenge, with 
literally hundreds of millions still languishing in abject poverty.  Another is the structural 
reality of India’s growth to date, as job creation in the services sector has come at the 
expense of similar progress in industry and agriculture.  A third is the Naxalite 
insurgency itself, since the instability and social breakdown it occasions in the areas 
where it is prevalent disrupt economic activity and prohibit the supply of desperately 
needed investment, economic aid, and governmental services.  For this reason alone, 
Naxalism presents itself as more than just a socio-economic problem – it also has a 
security dimension.  To some degree, the movement must be actively checked now if the 
benefits of development are to undercut its appeal in the future. 
There are other compelling reasons to address Naxalism from a security 
standpoint.  The movement poses a number of immediate dangers on the political, 
economic, and social fronts, threats already enumerated previously in this chapter, and 
ones that India needs to counter swiftly if its rise to great power status is to happen any 
time soon.  These security efforts will be for naught, however, if the underlying reasons 
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for Naxalism’s persistence are not adequately addressed.  What emerges is a two-part 
problem that will, by necessity, require a two-part solution.  This thesis is not intended as 
a policy paper, but with an analysis of the Naxalite phenomenon complete, the insights 
gained into the nature and danger of the insurgency allow for some cursory 
recommendations. 
2. Recommendations for India 
There does seem to be a growing awareness in New Delhi of the dual nature of 
the Naxalite problem, with Prime Minister Singh voicing his preference for a ‘two-
pronged’ strategy to deal with the Maoists.  India must pursue this approach at a national 
level, but with significant modifications to the initiatives advanced thus far. 
The most glaring needs are the formulation of a coherent national policy to 
address the insurgency and unified direction of the federal and state governments’ efforts 
to implement it.  The multiplicity of anti-Naxal committees, agencies, and task forces that 
currently exist in New Delhi have so far generated more bureaucratic inefficiency and 
confusion than cogent policymaking.  The recent formation of the Naxal Management 
Division and the Inter-Ministerial Working Group should help address this problem, but 
these bodies still probably lack the administrative authority to direct counterinsurgent 
efforts at the local level.  This is desperately needed, since most of the worst affected 
states are proving incapable of formulating any kind of effective challenge to the Maoists 
on their own – indeed, some state strategies are actually making  the problem worse.      
P. V. Ramana has recommended the creation of an Independent Ministry, reporting 
directly to the Prime Minister, which would take charge of all Naxalite-related security 
and development efforts throughout the country.296  Given the constitutional and political 
constraints, such an effort would likely prove contentious – nevertheless, it is a necessary 
first step. 
With such a body established, India would be able to more effectively implement 
the measures necessary to counter the insurgency.  On the socio-economic front, efforts 
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at national development (like market reforms and the SEZ initiative) should continue, but 
in a way more sensitive to those it will disadvantage in the short-term.  Laws designed to 
protect the land rights of the rural poor, like the Scheduled Tribes Recognition of Forest 
Rights Bill and the PESA Act, have been on the books for years but are honored mostly 
in the breach.297  Enforcement of such legislation must be dramatically improved, and 
funding increased for other rural aid and development initiatives, like the National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Program, that can address the problem of rising inequality in the 
countryside.298  Such efforts proved quite successful in helping to keep Naxalism in 
check in the 1970s and 80s, and there is no reason to believe they will be any less 
effective now.  
To ensure the efficient implementation of these programs, however, corruption 
needs to be rooted out and local governance improved, particularly in states like Bihar, 
Jharkhand, and Chhattisgarh.  Besides holding back the provision of badly needed social 
services, their persistent maladministration undermines faith in the Indian state, giving a 
critical boost to the Maoists’ legitimacy.  Cleaning up problems this pervasive will not be 
easy, but New Delhi could increase the use of President’s Rule to begin to address the 
challenge. 
On the security front, extremely aggressive center-directed policing actions were 
effective in the past but are probably not currently viable.  India is already under 
significant pressure over human-rights issues, and widespread offensive security 
operations carry significant risk of abuses and collateral damage.299  These are already 
visible in the excesses of the Salwa Judum campaign.  Instead, New Delhi should strive 
to improve local policing in Naxal-affected areas, shore up the border with Nepal to 
inhibit collaboration with CPN, prevent the movement’s spread to other areas, and kill or 
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capture the Naxalite leadership.  Maoist insurgencies have historically been vulnerable to 
decapitation strikes, (witness the Naxalites themselves in 1972 or Peru’s Shining Path 
after the capture of Abimael Guzman), and the removal of Ganapathy and the other 
members of the CPI-Maoist Central Committee would be a serious setback for the 
movement throughout the country.  Dedicated counterinsurgency units, modeled on 
Andhra Pradesh’s highly successful Greyhounds, would be the most effective means of 
carrying out this targeted offensive action. 
3. Recommendations for the United States 
As for the United States, all assistance possible should be rendered to India in its 
efforts to combat the Naxalite insurgency.  Some efforts have already been made in this 
regard, under the rubric of the two nations’ security cooperation agreements.  The State 
Department’s Counterterrorism Office listed the CPI-Maoist among its ‘Other Groups of 
Concern’ in 2004, and has since trained hundreds of Indian security officers in its Anti-
Terrorism Assistance Program.300  In 2006, United States forces conducted a series of 
small-scale joint anti-terrorism exercises with the Indian Army, and in May of that year, 
Reuters reported that the United States had offered the state of Chhattisgarh 
counterinsurgency training, demining assistance, and humanitarian aid for refugees 
created by Maoist violence.301 
Nevertheless, more can and should be done.  Officially declaring the CPI-Maoist 
a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organization’ would allow for greater direct assistance to New Delhi 
in its fight against the insurgency.  This designation has already been applied to the New 
People’s Army in the Philippines, a much smaller Maoist movement that arguably offers 
a relatively minor threat to American interests.  India would benefit most, however, from 
expanded anti-terrorism training for its security forces, modern weapons and 
communication equipment for its local police, and greater monetary aid to fund its rural 
                                                 
300 United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2005,” Office of the 
Coordinator for Counterterrorism, April 2006: 147. 
301 Reuters, “US Offers Help to Fight Maoists: Official,” May 26, 2006;  
United States Department of State, “Country Reports on Terrorism 2006,” Office of the Coordinator for 
Counterterrorism, April 2007, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2006/82734.htm (accessed March 30, 2008).  
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development efforts.  These steps would do more than just help defeat the Naxalites; they 
would also strengthen a burgeoning alliance, one the United States is likely to depend on 
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